“The Possibility of a Beloved Place”:  Residents and Placemaking in Public Housing Communities by Bennett, Susan
Saint Louis University Public Law Review 
Volume 19 
Number 2 Representing the Poor and 
Homeless: Innovations in Advocacy (Volume 
XIX, No. 2) 
Article 6 
2000 
“The Possibility of a Beloved Place”: Residents and Placemaking 
in Public Housing Communities 
Susan Bennett 
American University, Washington College of Law, sbennet@wcl.american.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/plr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Bennett, Susan (2000) "“The Possibility of a Beloved Place”: Residents and Placemaking in Public Housing 
Communities," Saint Louis University Public Law Review: Vol. 19 : No. 2 , Article 6. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/plr/vol19/iss2/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Saint Louis University Public Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more 
information, please contact erika.cohn@slu.edu, ingah.daviscrawford@slu.edu. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
 
259 
“THE POSSIBILITY OF A BELOVED PLACE”:  RESIDENTS AND 
PLACEMAKING IN PUBLIC HOUSING COMMUNITIES 
SUSAN BENNETT* 
What we need to live well, to dwell, is to trust in the possibility of a beloved 
place and our own significant part in the making of such places. 1 
I.  PROLOGUE: “IT IS TO BE HOPED THAT THEIR REMOVAL WILL BE EFFECTED 
WITH AS MUCH GENTLENESS AS POSSIBLE”2—THE DEATH AND DISCOVERY OF 
SENECA VILLAGE 
Between 1825 and 1829, a Dutch immigrant landholder sold off fifty 
parcels of farmland lodged between what are now 89th and 82nd streets on the 
north and south, and the Great Lawn of Central Park and Central Park West, of 
Manhattan.3  Of the fifty lots, twenty-four were purchased by elders of the 
African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church and by a group of free African 
American families. These first settlers raised nine wood frame houses in those 
first four years.4 Over the next three decades, some six hundred souls, in sixty 
households, would build their homes, pay taxes, and rear children in the 
community of Seneca Village.5 On this ground they built a church, and then 
two more; consecrated two cemeteries, and established a “Colored School” for 
the children. By 1856, 264 residents lived there, about two thirds of them 
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thought comments. 
 1. LYNDA H. SCHNEEKLOTH & ROBERT G. SHIPLEY, PLACEMAKING: THE ART AND 
PRACTICE OF BUILDING COMMUNITIES 18 (1995). 
 2. See infra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 3. New York Historical Society, “What is Seneca Village” Exhibition Flier (1997) (on file 
with the author). 
 4. ROY ROSENZWEIG & ELIZABETH BLACKMAR, THE PARK AND THE PEOPLE: A HISTORY 
OF CENTRAL PARK 65 (1992). 
 5. Id. at 70. 
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African Americans, and about one-third the more recent arrivals, mostly Irish 
with a scattering of German immigrants.6 
By the fall of 1857, the houses were condemned, the families were 
dispersed, and the AME church and school were gone.7 The rest of the 
dwellings and institutions followed. Construction on Central Park began in 
1858. Seneca Village disappeared to all but a handful of historians8 until the 
excavation of Central Park’s Great Lawn in 1996, when archaeologists 
uncovered the foundations, shards and other fragments of a thriving, racially 
and ethnically diverse community.9 
Why this settlement grew, died, and was forgotten so quickly, is a lesson in 
the power of “spin” and the persuasiveness of a dominant story. One among 
many pressures that produced Central Park was the agitation of wealthy 
landholders on the Upper West Side for a barrier against the swelling 
population of African American and particularly Irish residents to their 
immediate south.10  A contemporary account of the plan to clear the land 
expressed sympathy for and distinguished the village’s African American 
residents from their less desirable neighbors: 
“. . .west of the reservoir, within the limits of the Central Park, lies a neat little 
settlement known as ‘Nigger Village.’ The Ebon inhabitants. . . present a 
pleasing contrast in their habits and the appearance of their dwellings to the 
Celtic occupants, in common with hogs and goats, of the shanties in the lower 
part of the Park. . . .” “It is to be hoped that their removal will be effected with 
as much gentleness as possible.”  (italics in the original)11 
Subsequent renditions omitted any mention of the existence of a stable 
settlement within the bounds of the future park. Egon Viele, the first engineer 
for the Central Park project, described the site as: “. . .the refuge of about five 
 
 6. New York Historical Society, supra note 3.  For a detailed description of the New York 
Historical Society’s exhibit, “Before Central Park: The Life and Death of Seneca Village,” 
including information on the individual households of the settlement, see Douglas Martin, A 
Village Dies a Park is Born, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1997, at C1.  Many reporters covered the 
opening of the Society’s exhibit in January 1997; a particularly engaging story described one 
Brooklyn resident’s discovery that his ancestors on his mother’s side may have lived in Seneca 
Village.  See Clyde Haberman, The History Central Park Almost Buried, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 
1997, at B1. 
 7. ROSENZWEIG & BLACKMAR, supra note 4, at 89. 
 8. For interviews with historians Roy Rozenzweig and Peter Salwen, whose research of city 
maps and tax records had persuaded them of the existence of a settlement even before physical 
artifacts of Seneca Village were uncovered, see Douglas Martin, Before Park, Black Village:  
Students Look Into a Community’s History, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1995, at B1. 
 9. Michael Finnegan & Chrisena Coleman, Central Park Hiding Village Artifacts, N.Y. 
DAILY NEWS, Jan. 9, 1998, at 35. 
 10. EDWIN G. BURROWS & MIKE WALLACE, GOTHAM: A HISTORY OF NEW YORK CITY TO 
1898, at 792 (1999). 
 11. N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1856. 
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thousand squatters, dwelling in rude huts of their own construction, living off 
the refuse of the city. . . .”12 and set the tone for all to follow.  Ten years later, 
the memory of the “neat little settlement” had metamorphosed further. One 
writer dismissed the village as less than negligible: 
“. . .a dreary waste of sterile rocks. . ., relieved now and then by filthy sink-
holes and pools of stagnant water. Upon these rocks and around these pools 
were gathered a large number of rickety little one-story shanties, and a mixed 
population of ‘squatters,’ mostly Irish, and pigs, goats, chickens, cows and 
children. . . . . an excrescence on the fair features of the City. . . .” 
Celebrating the dispersal of this “population” by the police, the writer 
commemorated the “. . .herculean task which lay before them, particularly that 
of ridding the round of its squatters, pigs and other animals. The raid made by 
the police upon these stubborn ‘insects’ will not be forgotten.”13  In a final and 
lasting transformation, in 1907 a local historian depicted the neighborhood 
buried under the Park as a “wilderness” and “waste” of “. . .many families of 
colored people with whom consorted and in many cases amalgamated debased 
and outcast whites.”14 
II.  TODAY’S “URBICIDES”: MARGINALIZATION AND DISPERSAL OF 
DISTRESSED COMMUNITIES 
To clear the way for the new park, the residents of Seneca Village had to 
be made to disappear. Their marginality made the trick easy. The repeated 
depiction of the settlement as ragged—a wasteground of discarded, 
disconnected pieces of urban life, some of them human—sealed its elimination 
from place and from memory. 
What happened to Seneca Village set a pattern for a process: the 
diminishment of a population in preparation for its dispersal. One author has 
combined the triple processes of diminishment, dispersal and demolition under 
one coinage, “urbicide,” and has located it as early in history as the sack of 
Troy and the diaspora of the Jews under the Babylonian captivity.15  Seneca 
Village presents a more recent example. Closer to our time still, the urban 
renewal sparked by the incentives offered through the 1949 National Housing 
Act bears all the hallmarks of urbicide:16 the subordination of local and 
 
 12. ROSENZWEIG & BLACKMAR, supra note 4, at 64. 
 13. Local Intelligence – Central Park, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1866. 
 14. ROSENZWEIG & BLACKMAR, supra note 4, at 67 (quoting JOHN PUNNETT PETERS, 
ANNALS OF ST. MICHAEL’S, 1807-1907, at 445-6 (1907)). 
 15. Marshall Berman, Falling Towers: City Life After Urbicide, in GEOGRAPHY AND 
IDENTITY: LIVING AND EXPLORING THE GEOPOLITICS OF IDENTITY 172, 172-5 (1996). 
 16. For a critique of the financial incentives for residential demolition provided in the United 
States and National Housing Acts, see ROBERT HALPERN, REBUILDING THE INNER CITY: A 
HISTORY OF NEIGHBORHOOD INITIATIVES TO ADDRESS POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 67-8 
(1995). 
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particular to city-wide and abstract interests; the imposition of one aesthetic 
vision of a city on one neighborhood’s vision of itself; and the ease with which 
local interests and neighborhood visions could be minimized, held as they were 
by populations already isolated by race. The examples are legion—the West 
End in Boston,17 Oak Street in New Haven,18 “Southwest” in the District of 
Columbia,19—as are the critiques, the most powerful of which mourn the loss 
of self-contained, flawed but vibrant worlds.20 
Among the marginal communities most recently to be dispersed in the 
process of urban renewal is that of public housing residents. By architectural 
and political design, public housing complexes began their history in racial and 
geographical isolation, an isolation intensified over the years by demographic 
shifts, labor and housing market forces, and vicissitudes of federal housing 
policy.  Atrocious management and withdrawal of federal financial support for 
maintenance made of many complexes notorious hellholes that replicated the 
worst features of the early twentieth century slums that they were built to 
replace.  From the early 1970’s on, media coverage of spectacles such as the 
demolition of the Pruitt-Igoe towers in St. Louis heightened public awareness 
of the reality of physical decline of some public housing, so that all public 
housing came to represent the most removed, the most “other” of isolated poor 
communities, the archetype of the “outcast ghetto.”21 
 
 17. Herbert Gans took up residence in the West End to study the impact of the impending 
redevelopment of the neighborhood on the residents.  He left seven years later, at the beginning of 
demolition, an opponent of the redevelopment and a believer in the vitality and cohesiveness of 
the West End’s Italian immigrant working class community (as did my parents, then newlyweds 
and medical residents at nearby hospitals, who remembered the West End as a bustling and 
welcoming place to live).  See HERBERT J. GANS, THE URBAN VILLAGERS: GROUP AND CLASS IN 
THE LIFE OF ITALIAN-AMERICANS 305-6 (1962). 
 18. Robert A. Solomon, Building a Segregated City: How We All Worked Together, 16 ST. 
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 265, 287-8 (1997). 
 19. The video documentary, SOUTHWEST REMEMBERED: A STORY OF URBAN RENEWAL 
(Lamont Productions, Inc. 1990), depicts the elimination and redevelopment of the community of 
southwest D.C. during the mid-1950’s.  For the decisions that expanded the power of eminent 
domain to allow condemnation for not only public use, but public purpose, and in doing so 
cleared the way for the D.C. Redevelopment Land Authority to take down both residential and 
commercial buildings and re-sell the property to commercial developers in the name not only of 
elimination but prevention of the hypothetical recurrence of “slums and blight,” see Berman v. 
Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); and Schneider v. District of Columbia, 117 F.Supp. 705 (D.C. Cir. 
1953). 
 20. In addition to Gans’s study, supra note 17, for other contemporaneous descriptions of the 
impacts of 1950’s – style urban renewal, see MARTIN ANDERSON, THE FEDERAL BULLDOZER: A 
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF URBAN RENEWAL, 1949-1962, at 54 (1964) (estimating the eviction of 
some 609,000 persons by March, 1963 as a result of urban renewal); and Marc Fried, Grieving 
for a Lost Home, in THE URBAN CONDITION: PEOPLE AND POLICY IN THE METROPOLIS 151 
(Leonard J. Duhl ed., 1963). 
 21. Peter Marcuse, The Enclave, the Citadel, and the Ghetto: What Has Changed in the 
Post-Fordist U.S. City, 33 URB. AFF. REV. 228, 229-32 (1997) (describing the emergence of the 
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Today’s prescription for curing what have been depicted as undesirable 
concentrations of poverty, joblessness and attendant social pathology, is to 
disband them: to integrate present configurations of public housing community 
by type of housing tenure and consequently by income.  This is a goal that can 
only be achieved by moving current residents out, moving residents able to 
rent units and purchase homes at market rate in, and in some cases by 
demolishing the structures that have come to symbolize failure.  The HOPE VI 
program, HUD’s primary capital public housing initiative from 1993 to the 
present, has funded the demolition of an eventual total of 82,000 “severely 
distressed” public housing units, to be replaced with 51,000 “revitalized” units 
with a mix of housing types and rent levels.22  In this present incarnation, this 
is a strategy that has evolved in fits and starts over the past thirty years of 
federal housing policy. Taking the long view, one can see in it an echo of the 
urban renewal of years past, and the Seneca Villages and other urbicides of 
long ago. 
The question is whether the current residents of public housing will have a 
place in the new world order: will they have reason “to trust in the possibility 
of a beloved place,” and to take “significant part in the making of such 
places?” The question might seem as irrelevant now as it did to the mid 1950’s 
generation of policy makers and urban planners who looked at communities, 
saw none, and bulldozed them over. Indeed, some commentators look at the 
urban renewal of the 1950’s, with its significant loss of affordable housing 
units, displacement of thousands of poor tenants, and alliances with private 
developers, and at the “new urbanism” of HOPE VI, with its significant loss of 
affordable housing units, displacement of thousands of poor tenants, and 
alliances with private developers, and see little difference.23  Whether the 
participation of public housing tenants in place-making is possible or even 
desirable depends in part on the perception of which Seneca Village these 
residents now inhabit: the “neat little settlement” of contemporaneous 
description and present-day historians’ revelation; or the “wilderness and 
waste” that was, and is, the prevailing view of public housing. 
That participation may also depend on what this essay will explore as an 
anomaly, or at least a contradiction within federal housing policy: a sporadic 
history of support for public housing residents to organize and to take control 
of their physical environments. From the early 1970’s, when foundation and 
federal funds picked up on spontaneous insurgencies to help tenants take over 
 
“outcast ghetto” an urban phenomenon distinct, in its greater exclusion from mainstream society, 
from the “ghetto”). 
 22. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, HOPE VI FACT SHEET (1999). 
 23. See Larry Bennett, Do We Really Wish to Live in a Communitarian City?: 
Communitarian Thinking and the Redevelopment of Chicago’s Cabrini-Green Public Housing 
Complex, 20 J. URB. AFF. 99, 113-4 (1998). 
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management of their properties, through a resurgence of enthusiasm for tenant 
training for self management in the mid 1980’s, federal programs focused on 
resident management as a favored strategy for resident involvement. Resident 
management is only one of any number of strategies, and only one of any 
number of markers for the ability of tenants in public housing to constitute 
community. More recently, Congress deepened and broadened its funding of 
resident initiatives to include training in basic board development; most 
recently, funding for community building in public housing has responded to 
time limits imposed in the revised public welfare system, and focused more on 
assisting the individual resident in developing job skills for use off the 
premises than organizing skills for use on them.  Today’s articulation of the 
mandate for direct provision of low rent housing, the Quality Housing and 
Work Responsibility Act of 1998 (QHWRA)24 simultaneously espouses tenant 
empowerment and tenant dispersal, two goals that seem so hard to reconcile 
that they pose an internal contradiction. 
Few raise their hands in support of public housing. People even like to 
blow it up. The dramatic, and dramatized, implosion of the fourteen-story high 
rises at the Murphy Homes in Baltimore assumed an air of cathartic 
celebration, scheduled as “a spectacular kickoff to the July Fourth weekend.”25  
The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) listed the 
demolition of 100,000 public housing units by fiscal 2003 as one of its 
performance goals in its 1999 Annual Performance Plan;26 since 1992, some 
56,500 units have been lost to the public housing inventory, approximately 
eighty percent of them removed through demolition.27  A tangible, visible 
target, public housing has been easier to vilify than public welfare. But in a 
housing economy in which many who earn minimum wage would have to 
work between 103 and 133 hours a week to earn the amount necessary to make 
rent on a two bedroom apartment,28 and full time teachers, police officers and 
 
 24. Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-276, 112 Stat. 
2461, 2518 (1998) [hereinafter QHWRA]. 
 25. Sarah Pekkanen & Zerline A. Hughes, After 36 Years, a Pile of Memories, BALTIMORE 
SUN, July 4, 1999, at A1. 
 26. MARTIN D. ABRAVANEL ET AL., BUILDING HEALTHY COMMUNITIES THROUGH 
FEDERAL HOUSING POLICY: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 10 n. 7 (1998). 
 27. Conversation with Ainars Rodin, Dir. for Demolition and Disposition, Special 
Applications Unit, Dep’t of Housing and Urban Development (June 15, 2000); U.S. DEP’T OF 
HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, DEMOLITION/DISPOSITION FISCAL ACTIVITY SUMMARY, 
NATIONAL REPORT (as of June 14, 2000) (reporting 101,906 units approved for removal from the 
public housing inventory, to include demolition or disposition, between 1992 and 2000, with 
56,544 units actually removed). 
 28. NATIONAL LOW INCOME HOUSING COALITION/LOW INCOME HOUSING INFORMATION 
SERVICE, OUT OF REACH (1999), available at http:www.nlihc.org/oor99/badmetro.htm. 
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laborers seek emergency overnight shelter,29 no housing resource can be taken 
for granted. The question is whether populations associated with public 
housing can be. 
III.  “WHERE DOES COMMUNITY GROW?”30—DEPICTIONS, DE-
CONCENTRATION, AND DISPERSAL OF PUBLIC HOUSING COMMUNITIES 
Some might dispute that “community” fits with “public housing”—that 
public housing, often described early in its history as a way station, and later as 
shelter of last resort for the hardest to house, was in its conception and its very 
physical design intended to discourage any formation of community.  As I will 
describe later, there is consensus on at least some of the history, politics, and 
assessment of the physical features: that much public housing was deliberately 
sited in areas rejected by builders of market-rate housing, where poor people of 
color already endured limited access to jobs, transportation and public services; 
and that often its builders corrupted its maladaptive design with structural 
shortcuts and shoddy materials. What is much less clear is that these historical 
antecedents of necessity produced conditions that crippled the generation of 
community.  But media attention to some of the more spectacular physical 
deficiencies, and the acceptance into popular perception and social policy of 
theories with far-ranging import—theories about the impacts of physical 
structure, and segregation by geography, race and income on the behavior and 
self-image of residents of public housing—ultimately have made of these 
conditions a kind of inevitability, and of the dispersal of these communities an 
unexamined given. I will review some of those influences here. 
A. A River of Trees, A Sewer of Glass: Theories of the Influence of Design on 
the Construction of Public Housing Community 
Many theories contribute to the conviction that public housing complexes 
provide inhospitable soil for the growth of community.  One of the most 
persuasively argued is that the very design of public housing structures 
doomed them to decay, and their inhabitants to dysfunctionality, from the 
beginning. This conclusion derives from several analyses that often get 
compacted together. Each proceeds from different assumptions, depending on 
 
 29. Evelyn Nieves, Many in Silicon Valley Cannot Afford Housing, Even at $50,000 a Year, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2000, at 20 (reporting that some full time employees in service jobs in 
northern California use their full day passes to nap all night on public busses, as the only shelter 
they can afford; that 34% of homeless people in Santa Clara County work full time; and that 
teachers, police officers, firefighters, and others earning more than $50,000 a year must seek help 
at overnight shelters). 
 30. Rebekah Levine Conley et al., Where Does Community Grow? The Social Context 
Created by Nature in Urban Public Housing, 29 ENV’T & BEHAV. 468 (1997). 
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the belief of the proponents in the inherent power of architecture to create 
patterns of social interaction and behavior. 
One view of public housing construction and design is that it was built to 
look “cheap and proud of it,” to save money but also demonstratively to 
distinguish low rent from ingrained expectations of the appearance of middle 
class housing.31  At least one commentator has suggested that, in general, 
renting historically has enjoyed less social and political support than owning, 
and renters in any income bracket are considered to be more questionable 
contributors as citizens than are home owners.32  If one accepts that thesis, then 
renters in low rent, government-owned housing labor under a dual opprobrium.  
Lawrence Vale, a professor of urban studies and planning at MIT who has 
contributed to the re-design of several public housing complexes in Boston and 
has written extensively about the design and history of public housing,33 has 
pushed the position further: that public housing was designed not only to 
distinguish but to stigmatize. He has observed, first, that there is “. . .a 
hierarchy of architectural styles and spatial arrangements”34 that manifests the 
hierarchy of housing tenures, with owned housing at the top of the scale and 
public housing at the bottom. Next, he has suggested that public housing 
renters feel the impact of living at the bottom of the architectural pile not 
merely from the shame of association with visibly stigmatized structures and 
exclusion from the world of those who live in more acceptable ones, but from 
internalization of the architectural stigma: that “. . .layers of stigma blend and 
merge into a single image of the ‘undeserving poor.’”35  This image projects to 
the “outside” world, but intrudes inwardly as residents absorb the pain of the 
stigmatization.36 
This last contention—that physical environment works as a molder of 
character and of world view—extends, but also says something different from, 
the observation that the built physical environment of public housing operates 
externally, as political symbol. It claims a power for bricks and mortar and 
 
 31. John Atlas & Peter Dreier, From “Projects” to Communities: Redeeming Public 
Housing, J. HOUSING 21, 26 (1993). 
 32. See Donald A. Krueckenberg, The Grapes of Rent: A History of Renting in a Country of 
Owners, 10 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 9, 10 (1999). 
 33. See, e.g., Lawrence J. Vale, Public Housing Redevelopment: Seven Kinds of Success, 7 
HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 491 (1996); Lawrence J. Vale, The Revitalization of Boston’s 
Commonwealth Public Housing Development, in AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND URBAN 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 100 (Willem van Vliet ed., 1997). 
 34. Lawrence J. Vale, Destigmatizing Public Housing, in GEOGRAPHY AND IDENTITY: 
LIVING AND EXPLORING GEOPOLITICS OF IDENTITY 226 (Dennis Crow ed., 1996). 
 35. Id. at 439. 
 36. Not all observers of public housing residents and their attitudes towards their homes 
would agree; surveys performed in the mid 1970’s of residents of many different public housing 
complexes scattered across the country suggest that many felt positive about their housing.  See 
RACHEL BRATT, REBUILDING A LOW-INCOME HOUSING POLICY 63-4 (1989). 
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configuration of space that others see as incidental. But some have argued that 
the most-maligned features of public housing architecture actually were 
conceptualized not to stigmatize, but to uplift. Alexander von Hoffman has 
noted that the two characteristic features of 1950’s public housing design—the 
“super-block,” the parallel rows of buildings that extend beyond the limits of a 
city block, and the high-rise tower—simply adopted the fashions of post-war 
European modernist architecture.37  Von Hoffman views the adaptation of 
these elements of design to public housing as just one more example of what 
he calls “visionary idealism,” the idea that “. . .manipulation of the 
environment can improve the social circumstances and behavior of the 
poor. . . .”38  This architectural hubris channeled the more altruistic impulses of 
affordable housing policy from the Progressive through the post-war eras. The 
goal of architecture for the poor was not to punish them for their poverty, but 
to pluck them from the disease and moral disorder of tenements and re-lodge 
them in more salubrious settings. 
As von Hoffman has summarized the history and theology of the 
architectural modernism of the 1950’s, architects did not confine their faith in 
the ability of architecture to transform and provide moral uplift only to the 
poor.  As one of the first proponents of “defensible space,”39 principles of 
urban architectural design inspired by Jane Jacobs’s The Death and Life of 
Great American Cities, and formulated in part in direct reaction against the 
case history of the Pruitt-Igoe towers, Oscar Newman himself in retrospect 
viewed that debacle of design not primarily as a construct meant deliberately to 
stigmatize the poor people living within it, (though that may have been the 
effect), but as one example of the International Style gone wrong.  Pruitt-
Igoe’s eleven story towers, all thirty-three of them, were intended to 
accommodate desires for green space with a “river of trees” planted in the 
large, undifferentiated open spaces between the towers, and for living space 
with common laundry and garbage facilities, and common rooms on every 
third floor. Flaws in the execution, but primarily flaws in the basic concept, 
turned the “river of trees” into a “sewer of glass and garbage.”40  Pruitt-Igoe 
and other exemplars ignored not merely the elements associated with that 
object of desire—the middle class home with a front and a back and land the 
owner could walk around—but some more organic principles that the model of 
“home” shared with “defensible space:” the role of physical environment in 
creating for residents “surveillance opportunities” that contribute to the ability 
 
 37. Alexander von Hoffman, High Ambitions: The Past and Future of American Low-
Income Housing Policy, 7 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 423, 426-7 (1996). 
 38. Id. at 439. 
 39. OSCAR NEWMAN, DEFENSIBLE SPACE 50 (1973) (summarizing discussion principles for 
“defensible space,” including the influence of design on the “perception of a project’s uniqueness, 
isolation, and stigma”). 
 40. OSCAR NEWMAN, CREATING DEFENSIBLE SPACE 9-10 (1996). 
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to exercise “territorial influence,” or real control over space, and therefore 
increase residents’ psychic investment in the places in which they live.41 
“Obsolescence”—that which is so overtaken by time or fashion as to seem 
useless beyond repair—has become an indicator for the public housing units 
that will be marked for drastic renovation or removal.  Several years ago, HUD 
described the purpose of the HOPE VI program as one of “public housing 
transformation, “ a vision attainable through the obliteration of past mistakes: 
Changing the physical shape of public housing. This includes tearing down the 
eyesores that are often identified with obsolete public housing and replacing 
them with homes that complement the surrounding neighborhoods and are 
attractive and marketable to the people they are intended to serve, meeting 
contemporary standards of modest comfort and liveability.42 
As currently authorized through the QHWRA, the HOPE VI program funds the 
“. . .demolition, rehabilitation, reconfiguration, or replacement of obsolete 
public housing projects (or portions thereof).”43  In applying for awards for 
revitalization or demolition, public housing authorities must show that targeted 
buildings qualify as “severely distressed,”44 defined under the Act first as 
requiring the following: 
“. . .major redesign, reconstruction or redevelopment, or partial or total demolition, to 
correct serious deficiencies in the original design (including inappropriately high 
population density), deferred maintenance, physical deterioration or obsolescence of 
major systems and other deficiencies in the physical plant of the project;. . . .”45 
(emphasis mine) 
The fatalism underlying what I would call the “architectural determinism” 
position—that the flaws were poured into the concrete and lay as embedded 
there as original sin—has made it easy to collect all of the problems plaguing 
public housing, deem them irreparable, and call them “obsolescence.”  While 
headline value and visceral appeal contribute as well to the attractiveness of 
the solution, “obsolescence” justifies the ultimate course of action for reform 
of public housing, which is to dynamite the mistakes. As the National 
Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing noted, whatever the 
impact of flawed design, public housing throughout its tenure has suffered 
from shortfalls in funding for capital improvements and for routine and long-
term maintenance.46  It is simpler, and quicker, to eliminate buildings as 
 
 41. OSCAR NEWMAN, DEFENSIBLE SPACE 50 (1973). 
 42. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Notice of Funding Availability For 
Public Housing Demolition, Site Revitalization, and Replacement Housing Grants (HOPE VI), 61 
Fed. Reg. 38,024, 38,025 (1996). 
 43. QHWRA §535(a), 112 Stat. at 2581. 
 44. See Department of Housing and Urban Development, Notice of Funding Availability for 
the HOPE VI Programs, 65 Fed. Reg. 9599, 9603 (2000). 
 45. QHWRA §535(j)(2)(A)(i), 112 Stat. at 2584. 
 46. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON SEVERELY DISTRESSED PUBLIC HOUSING, THE FINAL 
REPORT 76 (1992). 
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outmoded, rather than to acknowledge that at least some of them represent the 
sad results of years of neglect. 
It is true that HUD relies on renovation as well as demolition to rejuvenate 
its inventory.  It has awarded fewer than half of its HOPE VI grants over the 
seven years of the program to projects solely for demolition.47  But as noted 
earlier and I will describe more fully below, the image of demolition carries its 
own momentum. “Obsolete,” as an element of “distressed,” has been stretched 
to cover not merely elements of physical design but philosophies of how and 
why poor people should be housed. 
Does it matter whether the contribution of architecture to the decline of 
public housing, and to public perception of it as “other,” was deliberate or 
maladroit? Whether design in and of itself predestined public housing to 
deteriorate, or whether deterioration resulted from the many political forces to 
which design only gave expression? And above all, did design of public 
housing cause residents to self-destruct within it? Ironically, at least one 
proponent of the theory that public housing was built bad, to look bad, to make 
residents feel bad, does not believe that confinement in public housing has 
drained residents of their will to create community. Vale comments positively 
on the cohesiveness of the Commonwealth Tenants Association, which 
negotiated a 223 page redevelopment management agreement with the Boston 
Housing Authority and with private management. 48  As I will describe below, 
one premise underscoring a quarter century of governmental support for 
resident management of public housing is that tenants can, or can be trained to, 
muster sufficient internal organization and drive to engage in self-
management. 
B. Faulty Towers: The Power of Media Images of “Wilderness and Waste” 
As Joseph Shuldiner, Assistant Secretary for Public and Indian Housing in 
the first Clinton administration admitted, the appearance of some public 
housing has fed its own bad press. In an interview in 1994, Shuldiner explained 
the difficulty of moving the public beyond its disapproval of public housing, 
when the physical face of public housing (especially in big media markets) so 
readily presents such easy grist for distaste: 
When I was back in New York everybody always used to say the thing that 
was killing us was Newark, because the editors from the New York Times 
 
 47. HOPE VI GUIDEBOOK, HOPE VI PROGRAM AUTHORITY AND FUNDING 
HISTORY 1, 6 (2000) (of 274 grants HUD awarded 35 for planning, 131 for revitalization, and 
108 for demolition only).  Since some revitalization projects also include plans for demolition, the 
number of demolition grants alone does not indicate fully the amount of demolition supported by 
the HOPE VI program.  Id. at 6 (describing revitalization grants for 1999 as assisting the 
demolition of 9815 units). 
 48. Vale, The Revitalization, supra note 33, at 110. 
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would drive in from New Jersey and they would go by those vacant buildings 
and say, that’s public housing. . . .If it’s good public housing, nobody knows 
it’s public housing. If it’s bad housing, everyone assumes it’s public housing.49 
Some of the worst satisfy expectations of the worst so easily that it is 
impossible to get beyond the gut-turning images of linked social and physical 
decay. A tenant of the Robert Taylor Homes in Chicago, frustrated at his 
inability to enlist Jesse Jackson in efforts to save the project from demolition, 
(“If you (Jackson) can go to Kosovo, Bosnia, why can’t you come to the 
Robert Taylor Homes?”) fared no better when he tried to engage a reporter’s 
sympathies through a tour of the property: 
His purpose was to show me that “it’s totally a normal life” and that the 
answer was honest management, not demolition. But the smell of urine in the 
hallways and sewage in the courtyards, the out-of-service elevators, the pitch-
black stairwell, the prison-grade steel webbing that encased the buildings, the 
young drug courier grinning boyishly at us as he played hide-and-seek with 
plainclothes cops—an hour and a half into Galtney’s tour, his case was in 
ruins.50 
The reporter concluded that he “began to understand why Belgrade under 
NATO bombing might be preferable. . . .”51 
Popular conception that community cannot grow in public housing has 
been reinforced by best-selling “hero stories,” such as There Are No Children 
Here.  Alex Kotlowitz’s graphic account, published first in a series of 
occasional pieces in the Wall Street Journal, and then as an extended chronicle, 
follows two brothers growing up amidst the deplorable conditions of the Henry 
Horner Homes.52  “Hoop Dreams,” the documentary, spends two years in the 
lives of talented high school basketball players in Cabrini-Green,53 another of 
the several public housing complexes in Chicago that attract so much 
journalistic attention. Ron Suskind, another reporter for the Wall Street 
Journal, portrayed a teenager struggling to escape an unnamed public housing 
project in southeast Washington, D.C. to make his place in the Ivy League.54  
In these extremely sympathetic narratives, only the superhuman strivings of a 
 
 49. Chester Hartman, Shelterforce Interview: Joseph Shuldiner, Assistance Secretary for 
Public and Indian Housing, 77 SHELTERFORCE ONLINE (Sept/Oct. 1994), available at 
http://www.nhi.org. 
 50. George Packer, Trickle-Down Civil Rights, NY TIMES MAG., Dec. 12, 1999, at 75, 78. 
 51. Id. 
 52. ALEX KOTLOWITZ, THERE ARE NO CHILDREN HERE (1991). 
 53. See W. David Koeninger, A Room of One’s Own and Five Hundred Pounds Becomes a 
Piece of Paper and “Get a Job:” Evaluating Changes in Public Housing Policy from a Feminist 
Perspective, 16 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 445, 445 n.1, 446 (1997) (citing Hoop Dreams, 
Kotlowitz’s book, and describing media coverage of conditions at Cabrini Green in Chicago). 
 54. RON SUSKIND, HOPE IN THE UNSEEN: AN AMERICAN ODYSSEY FROM THE INNER CITY 
TO THE IVY LEAGUE (1998). 
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single parent or an occasional teacher enable the courageous young 
protagonists to surmount their surroundings. Their immediate neighborhoods 
offer them nothing. The only “community” that the public housing complexes 
present consists of a gauntlet of obstacles to be overcome. Other depictions of 
life in public housing present the decay, without even the possibility of 
redemption.55  Exceptions, such as the documentary “No Place Like Home,” 
which chronicles the successes of public housing residents in managing their 
properties in Washington D.C., St. Louis and Boston, are few and far 
between—and shown on PBS.56 
As noted earlier in the example of coverage of the demolition of one of the 
high-rise public housing complexes in Baltimore, if squalor in high-rise public 
housing buildings draws media coverage, then the explosion of high-rise public 
housing buildings draws even more—and the promise of coverage draws 
explosions. Hartung and Henig evoke the image of then-secretary of HUD 
Henry Cisneros in 1995, taking a sledgehammer to the wall of one project in 
St. Louis, and pushing the button to bring down five towers in Philadelphia.57  
If the trip had been a rock concert, it would have been billed as the “HUD Ten 
City Demolition Tour” (without the T shirts).  Through the saga of Claribel 
Ventura, the mother of six who became a media icon for every possible 
negative association of welfare receipt with generational dependency and 
parental unfitness, Lucy Williams has demonstrated how coverage that seeks 
out the most sensationalist, stereotypical aspects of an image or event can 
affect policy more profoundly, and more swiftly, than the most carefully 
documented presentation.58  Coverage in mass print, visual, and other media 
has pushed the negative archetypal symbols of public housing—the high rises, 
the garbage, the gangs—into prominence, and more shaded images into the 
background. Despite the reality—that, as of the early 1990’s, only 6% of 
public housing stock was assessed as “severely distressed,”59 that only 27% of 
 
 55. In THE PROMISED LAND, Nicholas Lemann chronicled the pilgrimage of African 
Americans from the Deep South to Chicago through, among others, the story of Ruby Daniels 
and the public housing unit she moved into at Robert Taylor Homes.  By 1985, the apartment 
building showed all the archetypal symbols of public housing decay: “. . .littered with empty 
bottles and piles of uncollected garbage.”  NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE PROMISED LAND: THE 
GREAT BLACK MIGRATION AND HOW IT CHANGED AMERICA 295 (1991). 
 56. Corporation for Educational Radio and Television, the New Urban Renewal: Reclaiming 
Our Neighborhoods, Park III: No Place Like Home (PBS television broadcast, May 30, 1997). 
 57. John M. Hartung & Jeffrey R. Henig, Housing Vouchers and Certificates as a Vehicle 
for Deconcentrating the Poor: Evidence form the Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Area, 32 URB. 
AFF. 403, 404 (1997) (citing T. Uhlenbrock, Vaughn Complex is on its Way Down, ST. LOUIS 
POST DISPATCH, May 2, 1995, at B1, 2). 
 58. Lucy A. Williams, Race, Rat Bites, and Unfit Mothers: How Media Discourse Informs 
Welfare Legislation Debate, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1159, 1159-61 (1995). 
 59. THE FINAL REPORT, supra note 46, at 15. 
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public housing buildings were high-rises,60 and that only seven of the thirty-
four sites showing sufficient indicators of “severe distress” to merit HOPE VI 
awards between 1992 and 1995 included high-rise buildings61—“public 
housing” in the popular imagination means super-blocks, big towers, and bad-
smelling hallways. 
C. The People in the Buildings: Federal Preferences and Loss of Confidence 
in the Capacity to Build Community 
With the exception of the “hero stories,” images of public housing 
residents tend to take a back seat to images of the buildings they live in.62  
Deep digging into government monographs of limited circulation,63 
unpublished manuscripts64 and small press materials65 offers a glimpse of 
 
 60. John Atlas & Peter Dreier, From “Projects” to Communities: Redeeming Public 
Housing, J. HOUSING 21, 26 (1993). 
 61. HUD BASELINE ASSESSMENT OF HOPE VI, at 1-20 (1996) [hereafter HUD HOPE VI 
BASELINE]. 
 62. A “Nexis” search for January 1999 through June 2000, using “public housing residents” 
as the search term, yielded out of the forty-nine entries (including newswire services) two “hero” 
stories; two stories about programs to equip residents with marketable job skills; one story about 
a college scholarship fund for residents and raised by residents; one article about a college and 
career fair for public housing residents; and one article about home buying by public housing 
residents.  Most of the rest announced awards under the 1998 HOPE VI funding cycle.  See PHA 
Hires Resident Leader Jackie McDowell for Key Executive Post, PR NEWSWIRE, Aug. 16, 1999; 
Chris Grier, Shuttle Service Putting Woman on Fast Track Toward Success, THE VIRGINIAN-
PILOT, Aug. 25, 1999, at B9 (subsidized housing residents builds business to shuttle residents 
from homes to work); Public Housing Residents Get a New Change to Break Cycle of Poverty 
with Jobs in the Healthcare Industry, PR NEWSWIRE, Mar. 5, 1999 (about graduation ceremony 
for nurse’s aides); Glenn E. Rice, Unemployed find work in community; Public Housing Residents 
Help Build Neighborhood, THE KANSAS CITY STAR, June 18, 1999, at C4 (OJT for residents in 
construction trades); Knight Stivender, Public Housing Residents Aid Students, $1,000 
Scholarships Awarded to Four, THE TENNESSEAN, Aug. 20, 1999, at 6B; Public Housing 
Residents Invited to Attend College and Career Day, PR Newswire, Feb. 23, 2000 (college fair 
for residents in Richmond, Va.); Michael Lollar, Lewis Shares Knowledge of Route Out of 
Poverty, THE COMMERCIAL APPEAL, Mar. 28, 1999, at F7 (residents recount experiences in 
buying their own homes). 
 63. See generally SUSAN R. FRIES & G. THOMAS KINGSLEY, HOPE VI: COMMUNITY 
BUILDING MAKES A DIFFERENCE (2000) (prepared for HUD); ARTHUR J. NAPARSTEK, DENNIS 
DOOLEY & ROBIN SMITH, COMMUNITY BUILDING IN PUBLIC HOUSING: TIES THAT BIND PEOPLE 
AND THEIR COMMUNITIES (1997) (prepared for HUD). 
 64. The engagement of public housing residents in managing or buying their rental 
properties has been the subject of several graduate dissertations.  See, e.g., Monica E.S. Clarke, Is 
There a Way Out for Public Housing Residents?  A descriptive Study of Public Housing 
Residents and Efforts to Become Homeowners (1998) (Master’s Thesis in Urban Studies, 
University of New Orleans). 
 65. See Alma H. Young & Jyaphia Christos Rodgers, Resisting Racially Gendered Space: 
The Women of the St. Thomas Resident Council, New Orleans, in Marginal Spaces, Vol. 5 
Comparative Urban and Community Research 95-112 (Michael Peter Smith ed., 1995). 
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neighborhoods with thriving institutions. One can infer from materials even 
less widely available to the general public—court decisions and litigation 
materials—the determination of residents in some bitterly contested struggles 
over redevelopment to hold their own against dispersal of what they at least 
consider to be their community66—or certainly to care enough to dispute as to 
who among them most deserves to represent the community.67  Truly to get a 
good picture would require interviews with the residents, or at least resident 
leaders, identifiable to outsiders through, for instance, their association with 
HOPE VI redevelopment plans68—a labor-intensive project which is 
regrettably not part of this paper (or at least of this stage of it).  But the dearth 
of popularly broadcast images of anything good leaves space open for 
assumptions to control. Some assumptions are supported by data: that people 
who live in public housing are very poor;69 and that in some communities they 
are disproportionately minorities.70  Other assumptions—that residents in 
 
 66. Demolition plans under HOPE VI for the most popularized visible symbols of the failure 
of public housing, the projects in the Chicago Housing Authority’s inventory, have sparked 
significant litigations. See Cabrini-Green Local Advisory Council v. Chicago Housing Authority 
and Joseph Shuldiner, No. 96 C 6949, 1997 WL 31002, (N.D. Ill. Jan. 22, 1997). Memorandum 
Opinion and Order (denying defendants’ motions to dismiss the plaintiffs claims that CHA’s plan 
to demolish 1324 units and reserve only 300-325 of the replacement units for public housing 
constituted discrimination under the Fair Housing Act and Civil Rights Act of 1964 against the 
African American residents who would be displaced); Henry Horner Mothers Guild v. Chicago 
Housing Authority, No. 91 C 3316, 1998 WL 111582, (N.D. Ill. Mar. 6, 1998), Memorandum 
Opinion and Order (requiring the CHA to replace buildings slated for demolition under the 
recently suspended “one for one replacement” rule); Concerned Citizens of ABLA v. The 
Chicago Housing Authority, No. 99 C 4959, Complaint at 1-3, 29-34 (N.D. Ill. File July 29, 
1999) (alleging that the past and planned displacement of African American families from the 
Addams, Brooks, Loomis and Abbott developments violated the U.S. Housing Act, the Fair 
Housing Act and Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
 67. See also Alexandria Resident Council v. Alexandria Redevelopment and Housing 
Authority, 979 F.Supp. 409, 410 (E.D. Va. 1997) (describing competing claims of original 
citywide tenants’ association, and newly formed association, to represent residents of public 
housing complex slated for demolition); aff’d, Alexandria Resident Council v. Samual Madden 
Tenant Council and Alexandria Redevelopment and Housing Authority, (unpub. Op.) 153 F.3d. 
718, 1998 WL 415726 (4th Cir. 1998); vacated, 218 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2000) Ann O’Hanlon, 
Alexandria Officials Given Ultimatums (sic); Judge, HUD Threaten Sanctions if Tenants Not 
Allowed to Redevelop the Berg, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 1999, at Metro B2 (judge in the above-
captioned case orders housing authority for the second time to accept a redevelopment bid from 
the Alexandria Resident Council). 
 68. See generally Housing Research Foundation, at http://www.housingresearch.org. 
 69. See Paul Burke, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, A Picture of 
Subsidized Households in 1998: United States Summaries 40 (1998) (noting average income for a 
household to be $9100, or 25% of the national median). 
 70. Id. at 41 (noting 69% of residents of public housing nationally are members of minority 
groups, with 47% of them African American, 19% Hispanic, and 2% Asian or Pacific Islander).  
On concentration of poor and minority residents in public housing, see Douglas S. Massey & 
Shawn M. Kanaiaupuni, Public Housing and the Concentration of Poverty, 74 SOC. SCI. QTRLY 
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public housing do not work, that most of them receive income from public 
assistance,71 and that they consist overwhelmingly of female-headed 
households with many children72—are not. 
Rational or irrational assumptions about who public housing residents are 
may fix presumptions about their capacity to organize and to participate 
actively in the formation of community. Even sophisticated students of public 
housing policy have inferred something from the operation of the federal 
preference program about the “place-making” capacity of public housing 
residents. Never in the history of the program has public housing supply met 
demand; since almost the beginning, it has been a tenet of public housing law 
that housing authorities had to set priorities for managing their waiting lists, 
usually in ways that indicated current thinking about who public housing was 
supposed to serve and what needs it was supposed to meet. The National 
Housing Act of 1949 required priority placement in public housing—at least 
on paper—for persons displaced by the urban renewal it set in motion.73  Some 
twenty years later, the National Commission on Urban Problems assessed that 
accommodation as creating pockets of the residents least able originally to re-
locate themselves, and “. . .often referred to as problem families or the 
pathologic poor. . .,” whose presence in public housing prompted more “self-
respecting families” to move out.74 
In 1979 Congress enacted the first of what are commonly known as the 
“federal preferences” for waiting list management, requiring public housing 
authorities to reserve annually at least 50% of available units for families who 
were displaced or occupying substandard housing.75  Over the next thirteen 
 
108, 119 (1993) (finding that, for the Chicago study area, poor African Americans were far more 
likely to live in areas of concentrated poverty, in public housing complexes and in proximity to 
then, than were poor whites). 
 71. See Burke, supra note 69, at 40 (noting that 18% of public housing residents nationally 
received a majority of their income from welfare, including federal Temporary Assistance to 
Needy Families (TANF) or state-sponsored General Assistance; and that 24% of all public 
housing residents receive majority of their income from employment). 
 72. While 39% of households in public housing residents – not a small number – consist of 
single women with children, id. at 41, 32% of the residents are seniors, 24% are seniors with 
disabilities, and 30% are younger disabled persons (obviously there is overlap among these 
figures), id. at 40.  Although A Picture of Subsidized Households does not tabulate sized of 
families, it does indicate that 50% of the public housing inventory consists of one bedroom 
apartments.  Id. at 41. 
 73. National Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-71, § 302(a), 63 Stat. 413, 423 (1949) 
(requiring public housing agencies to give first preference for placement to families displace by 
“any public slum-clearance or redevelopment project initiated after January 1, 1947,” with 
preference within this group to families of service-connected disabled veterans). 
 74. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, 91st Cong., BUILDING THE AMERICAN 
CITY 111 (COMM. PRINT 1968). 
 75. Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-153, 
§206(a), (b)(1-2), 93 Stat. 1101, 1108 (1979). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2000] “THE POSSIBILITY OF A BELOVED PLACE” 275 
years, the categories of preference expanded to include homeless families, and 
persons paying more than 50% of their income in rent. For the other 50% of 
available units, public housing authorities were to engage in a public process of 
formalizing their own preference systems, with suggested priority holders to 
include families seeking reunification with children in foster care, and families 
in transitional shelters.76  It was this structure of preferences that Congress 
suspended in 1996,77 and which QHWRA repealed in 1998, leaving localities 
to decide which, if any, preferences to institute.78 
To my knowledge, no one has examined data sets—if such sets exist—
from 1979 to the present, to ascertain how or whether the legislation of federal 
preferences actually changed the composition of public housing residency. The 
empirical answer may not matter.  When public housing authorities were freed 
from the preference system in 1996 to favor tenants with earned income, many 
did so, as much as a means of collecting more income from rents as to vary the 
demographics of the tenant bodies. But they also chose working families to 
counter a perception, one born out anecdotally if impossible to quantify 
statistically, that public housing was occupied with unstable, expensive-to-
manage, families.79  Lawrence Vale expressed the popular wisdom that the 
preference system created a “disproportionate concentration of poverty and of 
households with multiple problems. . . .”, and warned that, whatever the truth, 
the very existence of the preference system contributed to the opinion that 
public housing had become a “repository for the nation’s ‘problem people.’”80  
Public housing residents themselves may feel the same way. Although earlier 
lapses in screening tenants may also have been to blame, loss of control over 
and apprehensiveness about who their new neighbors might be, may indeed 
have created cleavages between the “old-line” tenants and those admitted 
under the preference system.81 
 
 76. See 42 U.S.C. §1437d(c)(4)(A) (1990); for a summary of the legislative history of the 
federal preference system, see Stanley S. Herr & Stephen M.B. Pincus, A Way to Go Home: 
Supportive Housing and Housing Assistance Preferences for the Homeless, 23 STETSON L. REV. 
345, 353-87 n. 38-69 (1994). 
 77. Balanced Budget Downpayment Act I, Pub. L. No. 104-99, §402(d)(1)(A), 110 Stat. 26, 
41 (1996). 
 78. Veterans Affairs and HUD Appropriations Act, §514(a), 112 Stat. at 2547. 
 79. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and 
Research, The Uses of Discretionary Authority in the Public Housing Program, 6-7 (July 1999). 
 80. Lawrence J. Vale, Destigmatizing Public Housing, in GEOGRAPHY AND IDENTITY: 
LIVING AND EXPLORING GEOPOLITICS OF IDENTITY 226, 229 (Dennis Crow ed., 1996). For an 
emphatic view that the federal preference and other tenant selection policies resulted in public 
housing that is “utterly devoid of social capital,” see Lewis H. Spence, Rethinking the Social Role 
of Public Housing, 4 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 355, 367 (1993). 
 81. One resident leader included the move-in of undesirable tenants as one element in the 
decline of her apartment complex: “We saw people moving into our community that was not 
screened. We had no say-so as to who would come and be our next door neighbor.”  Tenant 
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D. The Concentration Reality and the De-concentration Imperative 
1. How “De-concentration” Became the Reigning Current Housing 
Policy 
No mandate in current federal policy for public housing rings more 
emphatically than the call for “de-concentration:” the dispersal of clusters of 
poor public housing tenants. There is little dispute that “concentration” is not 
only a demographic truth about public housing but a result of calculated 
political engineering. Historians of public housing concur that, from the 
beginning of the public housing program, policies of racial containment steered 
African Americans to particular complexes, and situated segregated public 
housing complexes in already segregated urban neighborhoods.82  In Chicago 
as elsewhere, New Deal public housing policy focused on improving housing 
for northward-migrating African Americans without disturbing existing racial 
neighborhood patterns, a concession reinforced by the Public Works 
Administration’s adoption of the “neighborhood composition rule.”83  No 
locale was forced to accept public housing, and it was a prize that few 
suburban enclaves wanted—so it was cities that created public housing 
authorities, and cities that absorbed greater concentrations of poor and minority 
tenants into areas already concentrated for class and race.84  Local urban 
housing authorities were susceptible to political pressures against locating 
public housing units in white, middle class neighborhoods, and to commercial 
pressures against competition for richer tenants. These influences forced 
decisions to squeeze more units into more expensive, more densely populated 
city space.85 
 
Management of Public Housing: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hearing and Community 
Development of the House Comm. On Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong. 22 (1986) 
(hereafter “1986 Hearing”) (statement of Lena Jackson, President, Lakeview Terrace 
Management Corp., Cleveland, OH). 
 82. For overviews of the federal role in increasing the isolation of minorities in inner cities 
and the racial segregation of the suburbs, see KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE 
SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 195-203 (1985) (describing the influence of the 
federal Home Owners’ Loan Corp. in encouraging the use of race and class-based criteria for 
lending).  For critiques of the federal role in racial steering in public housing, see ARNOLD R. 
HIRSCH, MAKING THE SECOND GHETTO: RACE AND HOUSING IN CHICAGO, 1940-1960, at 10 
(1983); Arnold R. Hirsch, “Containment” on the Home Front: Race and Federal Housing Policy 
from the New Deal to the Cold War, 26 J. URB. HIST. 158 (2000). 
 83. HIRSCH, MAKING THE SECOND GHETTO, supra note 82, at 14. 
 84. For a comprehensive review of the history of federal public housing construction, site 
selection, and racial discrimination, see Jon C. Dubin, From Junkyards to Gentrification: 
Explicating a Right to Protective Zoning in Low-Income Communities of Color, 77 MINN. L. 
REV. 739, 753 n.66, 754 n.67 (1993). 
 85. See JACKSON, supra note 82, at 222-27; BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, supra note 74, 
at 110. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2000] “THE POSSIBILITY OF A BELOVED PLACE” 277 
The question is not whether there is concentration of minority and poor 
people in public housing so much as whether that concentration itself has 
caused the evils associated with “outcast ghettoes.” “De-concentration” can be 
implemented in two ways; each has different purposes and histories, and arises 
from different premises about the impacts of clusters of poor people of color 
on neighborhoods.  The first, and older strategy, resulting from the 
Gautreaux86 litigation initiated in the 1960’s against HUD and the Chicago 
Housing Authority, promoted “de-concentration” as a remedy for a civil rights 
violation: the collusion of local and federal government in the segregation of 
African Americans in substandard public housing.87  The Gautreaux project, 
and its progeny, the Moving to Opportunity Demonstration,88 operate by 
moving small numbers of public housing tenants out, one by one, to 
neighborhoods more fully integrated by race and class. While the “mobility” 
strategy does assume a dearth of opportunity, and perhaps of community, in 
the projects from which it helps tenants re-locate, it also acknowledges a 
truth—that the same forces of discrimination that created “outcast ghettoes” 
also placed resources for education and employment beyond their residents’ 
reach, and, with assistance, public housing residents are capable of taking 
advantage of those resources. 
Compared to the incremental, long-term course of the family-based 
mobility strategies, “de-concentration” as a feature of present-day housing 
policy has a short history with broad impact. As that history has been re-
constructed, it began with Congress’s creation in 1989 of the National 
Commission on Distressed Public Housing, with the charge “to develop a 
national action plan to eliminate by the year 2000 unfit living conditions in 
public housing projects determined by the Commission to be the most severely 
distressed.”89 In its report, issued in 1992, the Commission recommended that 
Congress dedicate a ten-year appropriation to the “capital improvement and 
related needs” of the 86,000 units that the Commission had evaluated as 
 
 86. For the consent decree that set the parameters of the Gautreaux demonstration, see 
Gautreaux v. Landrieu, 523 F. Supp. 665, 672-82 (N.D. Ill. 1981). 
 87. For summaries of the import of Gautreaux and of the implementation of its consent 
decree, see Florence Wagman Roisman & Hilary Botein, Housing Mobility and Life 
Opportunities, 27 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 335 (1993); Leonard S. Rubinowitz, Metropolitan 
Public Housing Desegregation Remedies: Chicago’s Privatization Program, 12 N. ILL. U. L. 
REV. 589, 619-24 (1992) (describing the implementation of the Gautreaux demonstration). 
 88. See John Goering, The Moving to Opportunity Social ‘Experiment’: Early Stages of 
Implementation and Research Plans, 1 POVERTY RES. NEWS 2 (1997), available at 
http://www.jcpr.org/spring97/article2.html (describing the five city Moving to Opportunity 
(“MTO”) Demonstration, which monitors the effect of intense re-location support for public 
housing residents moving to integrated neighborhoods on their success in employment and new 
schools). 
 89. Department of Housing and Urban Development Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-
235, § 501(3), 103 Stat. 1987, 2049 (1989). 
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“severely distressed.”90  The Commission cited the presence of one or more of 
the following as indicators of “distress:” “families living in distress; rates of 
serious crimes in the development or the surrounding neighborhood; barriers to 
managing the environment; physical deterioration of buildings.”91  
Recognizing some baseline imperatives of what it costs for a public housing 
authority to run low rent housing, the Commission also suggested changes 
designed as much to raise more money from rents as to effect sociological 
experiments with the composition of the tenant body: to allow housing 
authorities to jettison the preference system; to admit a higher percentage of 
higher income families if rents were still to be calculated based on income; 
and, in some cases, to attract working families by setting flat maximum rents 
that would not increase with increases in earned income.92 
By 1999, that background had been re-written.  HUD has pointed to the 
National Commission’s Report as the direct ancestor of the HOPE VI program, 
stating that the core recommendation of the Report was that severely distressed 
units be “eradicated.”93  There was no such recommendation, the only 
reference to “eradication” being mentioned in the prefatory cover letters to 
Congressional committee chairs.94  Despite this claim for intellectual cover, the 
definition in QHWRA of “severely distressed—“ a definition that justifies the 
demolition of public housing stock—expresses a very long journey from the 
Commission’s original four-part articulation.  As quoted earlier, Congress 
expanded this definition in the QHWRA considerably, to include 
“inappropriately high population density” among the “serious deficiencies in 
the original design” of public housing defined as “severely distressed,”95 
QHWRA defines “families living in distress” as those who were “very low-
income families with children, unemployed, and dependent on various forms 
of public assistance.” It also adds as an indicator of distress any building that 
“. . .is a significant contributing factor to the physical decline of and 
disinvestment by public and private entities in the surrounding 
neighborhood. . . .;”96 The many indicators, old and new, are conjunctive: a 
 
 90. THE FINAL REPORT, supra note 46, at 18. 
 91. Id. at B-2, app. B. 
 92. Id. at 25, 69-70. 
 93. Department of Housing and Urban Development, HOPE VI Program Authority and 
Funding History, in HOPE VI GUIDANCE 1 (Aug. 2000), available at http://www.hud.gov/pih/ 
programs/ph/hope6/history_8-8-00.pdf. 
 94. THE FINAL REPORT, supra note 46, Transmittal Letter (Aug. 10, 1992) (summarizing 
(erroneously) the message of the Report: “to eradicate severely distressed public housing by the 
year 2000”). 
 95. QHWRA § 535(a), 112 Stat. at 2518, 2584 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1437v(j)(2)(A)(i)). 
 96. Id. at § 535(a), 112 Stat. at 2585 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437v(j)(2)(A)(iii)(I), 
1437v(j)(2)(A)(ii)). 
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building must fulfill all of them in order to qualify for funds for demolition or 
renovation.97 
The emphaticness with which QHWRA treats “concentration” leaves little 
doubt as to the prevailing political wisdom on its contribution to urban decay. 
The “Findings” of the QHWRA list “the concentration of very poor people in 
very poor neighborhoods” first among the problems by which public housing is 
“plagued;”98 “facilitating mixed income communities and decreasing 
concentrations of poverty in public housing” follows close behind among the 
“Purposes.”99  The Act affirmatively forbids public housing authorities to 
“concentrate very low-income families . . . in public housing dwelling units in 
certain public housing projects. . . .”100  QHWRA takes what were in part the 
Commission’s recommendations to allow flexibility in management and cost 
containment, and makes of them the technical instrumentalities to dismantle 
guarantees inserted in the U.S. Housing Act in the 1980’s that public housing 
would serve the poorest of the poor: it lowers from 75 to 40 the minimum 
percentage of residents who must have incomes at or below 30% of the area 
median;101 and it repeals the federal preferences mentioned above, allowing 
public housing authorities latitude to choose working families and adopt “local 
preferences,” based on assessments of housing needs.102  Public housing 
authorities must incorporate in their “public housing agency plan,” an 
innovation of the QHWRA, the steps they will institute in their admissions 
policies to assist in the “de-concentration of low income families.”103  Other 
statutory changes collaterally assist the drive towards de-concentration. They 
reverse guarantees on the supply side, parts of the statute added to hold the line 
 
 97. See, e.g., Notice of Funding Availability for the HOPE VI Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 9599, 
9603 (2000) (including among indicators of “severe distress” necessary to qualify for HOPE VI 
the elements catalogued in § 535(a) of the QHWRA, supra notes 95-96). 
 98. QHWRA § 502(a)(3), 112 Stat. at 2520. 
 99. Id. at § 502(b)(3), 112 Stat. at 2521. 
 100. Id. at § 513(a), 112 Stat. at 2544 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437n(a)(3)(A)). 
 101. Id. at § 513(a), 112 Stat. at 2544 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437n(a)(2)(A)).  See also 
Changes to Admission and Occupancy Requirements in the Public Housing and Section 8 
Housing Assistance Programs, 65 Fed. Reg. 16,692, 16,695 (2000) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. § 
960.202(b)) (explaining HUD’s Final Rule on “targeting”). 
 102. QHWRA § 514(a)(1), 112 Stat. at 2547 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(c)(4)(A)].  
See also § 519(a), 112 Stat. at 2555 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437g(e)(2)(B)) (requiring 
HUD to calculate into its formula for distributing operating funds to housing authorities an 
incentive to increase rental income from working tenants); Changes to Admission and Occupancy 
Requirements in the Public Housing and Section 8 Housing Assistance Programs, 65 Fed. Reg. at 
16,726 (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. § 960.206). 
 103. QHWRA at § 511(a), 112 Stat. at 2532-33.  See also Public Housing Agency Plans, 64 
Fed. Reg. 56,844, 56,863 (1999) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. § 903.7(c)(2)) (requiring public 
housing authorities to include in their public housing agency plans an admissions plan 
incorporating deconcentration as an objective); Rule to Deconcentrate Poverty and Promote 
Integration in Public Housing, Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 81,213, 81,215 (Dec. 22, 2000). 
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on, though not increase, the number of federally subsidized housing spaces for 
very low income people. The Act permanently eliminates the “one-for one 
replacement rule,” introduced in 1981 and suspended in 1995.104 
In contrast with the “mobility” strategy contemplated by Gautreaux and its 
spin-offs, the current strategy for “de-concentration” consists of 
simultaneously moving large numbers of public housing tenants out and either 
higher-earning eligible tenants, or market rate tenants in.  This is the version of 
“de-concentration” that most of the U.S. Housing Act was repealed in order to 
accommodate.  Where mobility strategies are gradualist, it is precipitous. It 
also aims to assist a different constituency: not solely, or even primarily, the 
residents who are being displaced, but a more ambiguously defined community 
of stakeholders, those whose revulsion at the deterioration they see or imagine 
may have prompted them to “disinvest” in the neighborhood. 
2. The “Second De-concentration” and Social Uplift: The “Truly 
Disadvantaged” and the Power of an Idea 
Intellectual history is always risky, but several factors may have influenced 
the change from, first, a preference for amelioration of public housing to 
eradication of it; and next, from broad characterization of the problem as one 
involving physical deterioration, crime and family distress, and unnamed 
“barriers” to management, to one far more specifically involving families 
receiving welfare, some causal connection between public housing and 
neighborhood-wide decline, and high density of residents as an element of 
faulty design. I have discussed a few possible influences: media portrayal of 
public housing as all high-rise and all decaying, despite data to the contrary; 
the belief that physical design inevitably marked public housing complexes for 
obsolescence; and the more quietly spoken conviction that the reservation of 
housing for the most desperately in need had brought in a less desirable tenant 
population. 
Some analysts of the evolution of public housing policy have commented 
that a confluence of factors has produced the imperative for “de-concentration” 
of the residents of public housing: a newly defined problem (as stated by the 
theory that concentrations of poor people, or of poverty, are responsible for the 
ills of the inner city) plus a solution available and already activated for other 
purposes (the shift from construction of public housing units to issuance of 
 
 104. See QHWRA § 531(a), 112 Stat. at 2573 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437p(d)) 
(allowing construction of new public housing units on the same site or in the same neighborhood 
after demolition only if the number of replacement units is “significantly fewer than the number 
of units demolished”); § 519, 112 Stat. at 2556 (forbidding use of capital or operating funds for 
construction that would increase the net number of public housing units, except when the 
construction is part of a “mixed-finance” project and would cost less than providing assistance 
through tenant-based subsidy); Rule to Deconcentrate Poverty and Promote Integration in Public 
Housing, Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 81,213, 81,215 (Dec. 22, 2000). 
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housing certificates or vouchers as a way to meet demand for very low rent 
housing), plus the political needs of the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development to “re-invent” itself and dodge the strafing from a newly elected 
Republican Congress hostile to its mission in general and to the concept of 
public housing in particular.105  Other influences included the advent of 
“welfare reform” in 1996,106 which renewed focus on the minority of residents 
of public housing who receive public welfare,107 and shifted priorities within 
HUD’s programs for tenants training from community organization to 
individual self sufficiency, a development I will discuss more fully below.  
Other elements derive from popular conceptions, hard to prove or disprove, on 
the deleterious effect of public or subsidized housing complexes on property 
values and the economies of surrounding neighborhoods.108 
One influence on the drive to deconcentrate can be traced with an unusual 
clarity. In his studies of concentrated poverty in Chicago, William Wilson has 
theorized that the departure from the inner city of jobs and, thus, of working 
people who can serve as role models, has reinforced the economic and 
geographic isolation of already marginalized poor neighborhoods. This 
isolation fosters the perpetuation of “ghetto-related behaviors and attitudes,” 
which in turn contribute to a fatal loss of productive community.109  While 
other researchers contend that the persistence of discrimination in housing and 
employment, not the absence of middle class exemplars, isolates poor and 
 
 105. John M. Hartung & Jeffrey R. Henig, Housing Vouchers and Certificates as a Vehicle 
for Deconcentrating the Poor: Evidence from the Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Area, 32 URB. 
AFF. REV. 403, 405 (1997). 
 106. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996). 
 107. Burke, supra note 69, at 40 (noting that 18% of public housing residents nationally 
receive a majority of their income from welfare, including federal Temporary Assistance to 
Needy Families (“TANF”) or state-sponsored General Assistance; and that 24% of all public 
housing residents receive a majority of their income from employment). 
 108. See Chang-Moo Lee, Dennis P. Culhane & Susan M. Wachter, The Differential Impacts 
of Federally Assisted Housing Programs on Nearby Property Values: A Philadelphia Case Study, 
10 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 75, 89 (1999) (finding that both public housing complexes and 
private complexes that rent to Section 8 certificate holders have “modest to slight negative 
impacts on property values”); Sandra J. Newman & Ann B. Schnare, “. . . And a Suitable Living 
Environment”: The Failure of Housing Programs to Deliver on Neighborhood Quality, 8 
HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 703, 726-27 (1997) (finding that, since public housing is located 
“disproportionately” in neighborhoods of low employment and deteriorating housing stock, it 
hurts the life chances of those who live there—but is not responsible for processes of 
neighborhood decline that in most cases had begun before the housing was built and constituted a 
reason for the choice of site in the first place). 
 109. See WILLIAM J. WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS 51-52 (1996) (explaining how loss 
in the inner cities of connection to the world of conventional paid work promotes adoption of 
behaviors maladaptive to functioning anywhere else); WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE TRULY 
DISADVANTAGED 57-60 (1987). 
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minority residents in undesirable localities,110 Wilson’s thesis has been 
influential at HUD. At least one HUD-commissioned study of public housing 
communities explicitly cites Wilson’s work in The Truly Disadvantaged in 
support of the proposition that isolation from mainstream norms and 
breakdown of interior institutions both cause and manifest an all-entrapping, 
self-reinforcing “culture of poverty.”111  Other commentators have attributed 
former HUD Secretary Henry Cisneros’s enthusiastic embarkation upon the 
policy of de-concentration to the influence of William Wilson and Douglas 
Massey.112 
The corollary of Wilson’s thesis—that the dysfunctionality of the “outcast 
ghetto”arises partly from the absence of role models—is that conditions of 
ghettos will improve if role models are introduced. One example of the thesis 
made flesh is the completion in 1991 of Lake Parc Place in Chicago, a 
renovation of two of six towers of public housing stock owned by the Chicago 
Housing Authority (CHA), which had vacated seven hundred families from the 
deteriorating site in 1985.113  Funded in part as a demonstration under the 
“MINCS” (Mixed Income New Communities Strategy) program which 
Vincent Lane, head of the CHA, lobbied into the Cranston-Gonzalez 
Affordable Housing Act of 1990,114 Lake Parc represented Lane’s espousal of 
the hypothesis that the severe isolation of ghetto residents deprived them of the 
opportunity for “collective socialization” through exposure to role models.115  
 
 110. See Douglas S. Massey, Andrew B. Gross & Kumiko Shibuya, Migration, Segregation, 
and the Geographic Concentration of Poverty, 59 AM. SOC. REV. 425, 442-43 (1994) (finding 
that concentrated poverty results from segregated housing markets, with “nonpoor” African 
Americans facing restricted housing choices that make them more likely to migrate to poor 
neighborhoods than to “nonpoor” ones); Scott J. South & Kyle D. Crowder, Leaving the ‘Hood: 
Residential Mobility Between Black, White and Integrated Neighborhoods, 63 AM. SOC. REV. 17, 
25 (1998) (finding that African Americans are “substantially” more likely than whites to leave 
racially mixed tracts for racially segregated ones, thus maintaining high levels of residential 
segregation by race). 
 111. ARTHUR J. NAPARSTEK ET AL., COMMUNITY BUILDING IN PUBLIC HOUSING: TIES THAT 
BIND PEOPLE AND THEIR COMMUNITIES 23 (United States Department of Housing and Urban 
Development 1997). 
 112. Peter Dreier & David Moberg, Moving from the ‘Hood: The Mixed Success of 
Integrating Suburbia, Vol. 7 No. 24 THE AMER. PROSPECT (1996), at http://www.prospect.org/ 
archives/ 24/24drei.html. 
 113. Michael H. Schill, Chicago’s Mixed-Income New Communities Strategy: The Future 
Face of Public Housing?, in AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND URBAN REDEVELOPMENT IN THE 
UNITED STATES 135, 142-45 (Willem van Vliet ed., 1997). 
 114. See Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 101-625, § 522, 
104 Stat. 4079, 4207 (1990), repealed by at QHWRA § 582(a)(10), 112 Stat. at 2518, 2644. 
 115. For the opinion that the MINCS project, as implemented through Lake Parc Place, 
represented a direct importation of Wilson’s THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED into housing policy, 
see Schill, supra note 113, at 148-49; James E. Rosenbaum, Linda K. Stroh, & Cathy A. Flynn, 
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The MINCS legislation allowed the Housing Authority to fill half of 282 
apartments with “low income families” earning between 50% and 80% of 
median income, and the rest with “very low income families” earning below 
50%, a departure from the usual income targeting requirement that 75% of 
residents of public housing earn below 50% of median.116  The goal was 
explicitly to put Wilson’s theses to the test: to monitor whether interaction 
between wage-earning tenants attracted from outside public housing, with 
average income of $22,000, and the returning former residents of this and other 
public housing complexes, with average income of $5000, would inspire the 
latter to economic self-sufficiency and compliance with house rules.117  The 
incentives to attract the higher income residents included significant spending 
on security and amenities not normally approved for public housing, such as 
landscaping and closet doors;118 and a cap on rents at $371 for the first five 
years of tenancy, as long as the tenant’s household income remained below 
80% of area median.119 
The lessons learned from this experiment in social engineering may not be 
the ones sought.  Researchers from Northwestern University surveyed (by 
interview and questionnaire) two groups of residents after they had lived at 
Lake Parc Place for a year. The first group consisted of twenty female heads of 
household of whom half were lower income former residents of public 
housing;120 the second, of 198 families, of which slightly under half were 
former residents of this or other public housing.121  What made the results 
ambiguous was the difficulty of asking what everyone really wanted to know: 
do you talk to/watch the children eat meals with tenants who are richer/poorer 
than you are, and if so, what effect has this had on you? The discomfort and 
flat-out insulted reactions of the poorer tenants to questions about their 
perception of their wage-earning neighbors as role models deterred 
interviewers from asking the same questions of the larger sample. Actual proof 
of any “role model effect” was hard to come by: the much smaller sample of 
residents who responded to a follow-up survey two years later reported 
decreases in employment.122  A different summary of the same study reports 
significantly more negative responses: the less poor interviewees regarded their 
 
Lake Parc Place: A Study of Mixed-Income Housing, 9 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 703, 714 
(1998). 
 116. See Rosenbaum, Stroh & Flynn, supra note 115, at 705-06; Cranston-Gonzalez National 
Affordable Housing Act § 522(f)(2), repealed by QHWRA § 582(a)(10) (allowed public housing 
agencies in the MINCS demonstration to fill up to half of their units with low income families). 
 117. Rosenbaum, Stroh & Flynn, supra note 115, at 714-15. 
 118. Id. at 715-16. 
 119. Id. at 705. 
 120. Id. at 720; Schill, supra note 113, at 151. 
 121. Rosenbaum, Stroh & Flynn, supra note 115, at 719. 
 122. Id. at 732-33 n.3. 
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poorer neighbors as messy and loud, and stated that they had either no time or 
inclination to socialize with them.123 
One critic of the Lake Parc project, and of Rosenbaum’s, Stroh’s and 
Flynn’s overview of it, finds the real lessons of the experiment to be 
unsurprising: that spending the kind of money for security, amenities and 
physical plant long withheld from conventional public housing properties will 
produce greater satisfaction on the part of residents, greater desire to maintain 
the properties in good condition, and generally better environments. The 
hoped-for lessons—that it takes wage-earning tenants to show their un- or 
under-employed neighbors how to act in rental housing and how to enter the 
job market—are unsupportable by the research designs, and may be ultimately 
unascertainable.124 
IV.  AN ALTERNATIVE VISION: ORGANIZATION FOR TENANT MANAGEMENT 
The Federal government has provided systematic recognition of, and 
support to tenants in, their capacity for self-governance in one particular 
context: that of property management. As the result of a campaign born of 
strange alliances, the Housing and Community Development Act of 1987 
instituted resident management as a routine, formalized feature of public 
housing.125  But resident management emerged in the 1970’s as a spontaneous, 
indigenous movement of residents outraged at the incompetence of their 
housing authorities; it expanded as a foundation-funded social experiment; and 
it flowered as a conservative strategy for the empowerment of individuals. 
Supporters of the concept came to it from all points on the political spectrum. 
It is useful to trace the resident management movement from its inception to 
the present as the one program which has drawn and continues to draw federal 
support for tenant capacity-building.  Particularly telling is how resident 
management has served changing concepts of the purpose of public housing—
as a way station, as shelter of last resort, as training arena for life skills, and as 
laboratory for citizenship. 
One historian of the public housing residence management movement has 
divided advocates for resident management into three camps, labeled by the 
company they kept: “conservative,” those who saw resident management’s 
value solely as a training ground for homeownership and eventual freedom 
from dependency on government subsidy; “liberal,” those who saw inherent 
good in resident management as an outgrowth of other CD endeavors, as a 
 
 123. Schill, supra note 113, at 151. 
 124. Lawrence J. Vale, Comment on James E. Rosenbaum, Linda K. Stroh, and Cathy A. 
Flynn’s “Lake Parc Place: A Study of Mixed-Income Housing,” 9 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 749, 
749-52 (1998). 
 125. See Housing and Community Development Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-242, § 122, 
101 Stat. 1839 (1987). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2000] “THE POSSIBILITY OF A BELOVED PLACE” 285 
collaboration which would make government more accountable, and as a 
strategy to improve residents’ quality of life; and “progressive,” those who saw 
resident management as neither a goal or means of empowerment, but one of 
any possible outgrowths of distinct processes of community organizing and 
strengthening.126  While strains of each justification for resident management 
echo throughout the entire history of such endeavors, four distinct periods of 
financial support for resident management emerge, each marked by the 
priorities and ideologies of the funders: the foundation-backed limited 
demonstration initiatives of the 1970’s; the homeownership—focused projects 
funded by the National Center for Neighborhood Enterprise through the 
1980’s; the assumption by HUD, through the Housing and Community 
Development Act of 1987, of responsibility for a wide-scale program of 
technical assistance to residents in the late 1980’s through the early 1990’s; 
and the more diffuse technical assistance initiatives funded through the Tenant 
Opportunities Program (TOP) and Resident Opportunities Self-Sufficiency 
Program (ROSS) from the mid-1990’s to the present. 
A. An End or a Means: Early Experiments in Resident Management 
A synergy of emerging strong tenant leadership and collective indignation 
over neglect by local public housing authorities of daily and structural 
maintenance produced the first attempts at resident management. In 1971, the 
Bromley-Heath Tenant Management Corporation signed its first management 
contract with the Boston Housing Authority.  Expanding to control three 
developments by 1973, the Corporation had grown from a base of grass-roots 
organizing in the 1960’s, when residents had built a tenant organization 
dedicated to providing social services, health care, and security.127  After a 
protracted rent strike and exhaustive negotiations with housing authority 
officials, from 1973 to 1975 tenant leaders in St. Louis assumed partial 
management responsibilities in five projects, with training sponsored by the 
Ford Foundation.128  Following closely on the St. Louis example, from 1976 to 
1979 the Ford Foundation and the Department of Housing and Urban 
 
 126. William Peterman, The Meanings of Resident Empowerment: Why Just About Everybody 
Thinks It’s a Good Idea and What It Has to Do with Resident Management, 7 HOUSING POL’Y 
DEBATE 473, 478-80 (1996). 
 127. Id. at 474; ARTHUR J. NAPARSTEK ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING AND URB. DEV., 
COMMUNITY BUILDING IN PUBLIC HOUSING: TIES THAT BIND PEOPLE AND THEIR 
COMMUNITIES 45-46 (1997). 
 128. MARY A. QUEELEY ET AL., NATIONAL TENANT MANAGEMENT DEMONSTRATION: THE 
FIRST THREE YEARS 11-12 (1981) [hereinafter NTMD 1981]; Tenant Management of Public 
Housing: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Community Development of the House 
Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong. 12 (1986) [hereinafter 1986 Hearing] 
(statement of Bertha Gilkey, President, Cochran Tenant Management Corp., St. Louis, Missouri). 
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Development co-sponsored the National Tenant Management Demonstration 
Program, funding and monitoring seven new management sites in six cities.129 
The National Tenant Management Demonstration embarked on a gamble: 
could outside funders, trainers and program designers generate the same 
conditions for resident control that had arisen out of the spontaneous activism 
of indigenous tenants’ leaders? Progress was slow in the first year. Although 
the initial elected directors of the tenant management corporations tended to be 
long-term, stable residents dedicated to restoring their properties to the 
orderliness they recalled from an earlier time, most of them struggled with 
their responsibilities. Most averaged an education level through 11th grade, and 
functioned as single heads of household. Initial turnover among the elected 
directors was high.130  The difficulty experienced by housing authority staff in 
adapting to changing roles, and residents’ unfamiliarity with group process 
forced trainers to scale back their expectations from training in property 
management to training in basic board functions such as how to conduct a 
meeting.131 Ultimately, after extensive training, tenants performed as well as 
their housing authorities had in executing key functions such as rent 
collections, filling vacancies, and responding to maintenance requests, and out-
performed their housing authorities in other measures.132 But the expense was 
considerable—training of residents and technical assistance ran up 
management costs from 13-62% over those incurred by housing authority 
management alone.133 
The most important findings from the demonstration may have been the 
most difficult to measure: what levels of tenant involvement and leadership 
correlated with (if not caused) the tangible measures of success? Some 
connections emerged: for at least the duration of the study, the resident 
management corporations most successful at executing “key functions” were 
those with the strongest tenants’ associations and leaders, where “strongest” is 
defined by extensive organization of and participation from the tenant body; 
and with the strongest links to local leaders outside the housing authority.134  
Other measures of success fell short of concrete standards such as reliability of 
rent collections, but had meaning for residents nonetheless.  Despite some 
burn-out, by the end of the demonstration tenant managers and their employee 
staff reported pride in their acquisition of not only the technical skills of 
 
 129. Peterman, supra note 126, at 475; MANPOWER DEMONSTRATION RESEARCH 
CORPORATION (MDRC), THE FIRST ANNUAL REPORT ON THE NATIONAL TENANT 
MANAGEMENT DEMONSTRATION 13-14 (1977) [hereinafter FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 1977]. 
 130. NTMD 1981, supra note 128, at 67. 
 131. FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 1977, supra note 129, at 30. 
 132. NTMD 1981, supra note 128, at 183-85. 
 133. Peterman, supra note 126, at 475. 
 134. Daniel J. Monti, The Organizational Strengths and Weaknesses of Resident-Managed 
Public Housing Sites in the United States, 11 J. URB. AFF. 39, 40 (1989). 
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property management, but of the “soft” skills of listening, negotiating and 
meeting people’s needs, and in their ability to make a difference in their 
neighbors’ lives: a sense of “. . .altruism and public spirit.”135 However 
significant the demonstration may have been for nurturing community 
cohesion and real improvement in living conditions, housing authorities saw no 
value in continuing this level of investment on their own: of the seven 
demonstration sites, only one survived past the expiration of the foundation 
funding.136 
In 1978, a year into the Demonstration project, enthusiasm during the 
Carter administration for tenant management generated a task force and a 
report, with recommendations for adoption of national regulatory standards for 
tenant participation in functioning of housing authorities.137  What was striking 
about the Task Force’s recommendations was that, despite the title, they 
emphasized first above all the importance of developing broad-based 
democratic participation by tenants in their own governance and in the 
governance of public housing. The report set out elaborate procedures for 
formation and recognition of tenants’ associations, and for triennial elections 
with third-party monitors.138  The organizational process was to culminate in a 
formal contract between the newly constituted and recognized tenants’ 
association and their housing authorities, in which the parties would agree on 
the substance of at least twenty-four management items, including lease 
provisions, tenant selection, eviction policy, rent ceilings, and demolition or 
rehabilitation.139  While these agreements were necessary preparations for 
tenant management, they could exist apart from it—this report conceived of 
community organization in a tenant body as an end in and of itself. 
The Task Force report and the short-lived National Demonstration 
experiment illustrated well the conflicting perspectives about the value of 
intense participation of tenants in the management of their dwellings.  Unlike 
their predecessors in Boston and St. Louis, the projects of the demonstration 
program were all generated from the top down, by program staff of Ford and 
HUD who saw the goal of tenant management as stabilization of the tenant 
body and cooperation with the housing authority, rather than as empowerment. 
As products of policy rather than of tenant initiative and hard-won 
collaboration with the local housing authorities, these programs lacked the 
internal strength and external support to survive the expiration of the 
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foundation’s funding.140 In contrast, the Task Force emphasized an 
incremental, bottom-up approach to resident management, in which—
following William Peterman’s “liberal” typology—strengthening of tenants’ 
capacity to organize became the most important factor.  While the details of 
the Task Force’s recommendations concerning tenant elections re-surfaced 
some fifteen years later in the form of the re-vamped Tenant Opportunities 
Program, arguably this was all that survived of them. That tenants could ever 
become full partners in management decisions short of actually assuming 
liability for management themselves was lost from the calculation. 
B. Technical Assistance and Training for Management: The Advent of A 
National Program 
Sharply curtailed budgets for every aspect of public housing—
construction, renovation and both simple and capital maintenance—in the early 
1980’s exacerbated deterioration of physical plants and neglect of basic 
services, re-creating (and in some instances reinforcing) conditions that had 
prompted the tenant-takeovers of the early 1970’s.141  Beginning in 1985, 
Robert Woodson’s National Center for Neighborhood Enterprise (NCNE) 
received funding from the Amoco Foundation to administer a three year 
technical assistance and property management training program for residents in 
twelve resident management corporations, some of which had operated 
continuously since the early 1970’s, some of which the new project sought to 
revive from the National Tenant Management Demonstration.142  Woodson, 
and to an even greater degree some of the resident leaders whom he sponsored, 
viewed resident management as an expression of self-determination and moral 
uplift. Federal support of resident management would do more than deliver a 
good return on scarce federal housing dollars in the form of improved rent 
collections and better services; it would counter the practice of channeling all 
federal program dollars towards problem populations, thereby implicitly 
“punishing responsible behavior.”143  In a later writing in which he excoriated 
affirmative action and public housing and social welfare programs as 
benefitting respectively only the black middle class and the “‘social service 
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industry,’”144 Woodson extolled resident management in public housing as a 
force for channeling neighborhood talent into local production of local assets 
that would remain in and enrich poor communities.145  Kimi Gray, a NCNE 
grantee, and chair of the only wholly resident-managed public housing 
complex in the District of Columbia, envisioned resident management as 
nothing less than the vehicle for re-engineering community through re-
construction of character: 
Once we educate our people, reprogram their different habits, take away their 
dependency, make them independent, restore pride, then we change our 
communities.146 
Evaluators of the NCNE grantees found that some did a better, and 
cheaper, job of delivering on routine maintenance and administrative services 
than their housing authority counterparts, particularly in cities with troubled 
public housing authorities.147  As was true of their predecessors (and for some, 
their younger selves) ten years earlier, tenant leaders saw the empowerment of 
participants as a more important product of management than the tangible 
deliverables.148 In contrast to public housing authority personnel, those 
residents who were involved in management at any level saw their role as one 
of strengthening their complexes into permanent communities within which 
they all could stay and prosper, rather than of holding the line on conditions 
long enough to enable residents to move up and out.149 
But there were some caveats. Even if tenant leaders acknowledged 
empowerment of residents as an important by-product, or even goal, of tenant 
management, it was not always clear that tenant management provided a 
vehicle for democratization or even broad community participation. Several of 
the enduring resident management corporations were dominated by visionary 
founding leaders, who moved the organizations forward but had scant regard 
for broadening tenant involvement in governance.  The much elegized, and 
recently eulogized, late Kimi Gray exemplified the strengths and weaknesses 
of this model.150  Her management style in the mid 1980’s generated 
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controversy and dissension among her constituents, particularly with her 
single-minded determination to evict lower-income residents in favor of those 
who were more economically secure, in preparation for conversion of the units 
to ownership.151  If “success” meant the capability not only to deliver on the 
day to day demands of routine maintenance, rent collections, and enforcement 
of house rules, but to promote new initiatives and address systemic problems, 
then resident management corporations with strong boards of directors and 
consistent interactions with the tenants carried the day—more so than did those 
with the isolated, strong leaders and more quiescent boards.152  Generally, all 
tenant organizations had trouble in sustaining the involvement of residents 
over the long term. Attrition of energy, plus the monopolization of authority 
and administration by a few, raised serious issues of succession, with low 
turnout at elections and little demonstration by tenants of interest in 
challenging the established leadership.153 
Of the twelve residents’ groups which Woodson’s project supported, only 
three remain on HUD’s current list of “full-service” resident management 
corporations—out of a total, across the nation, of twelve.154  Given this 
survival rate (on which more, later), the most lasting of the NCNE’s 
accomplishments may have been its convocation of grantees to lobby in 1986 
for H.R.4026, a federally funded program of technical assistance to assist in 
the formation development of new “resident management entities” and in the 
support of existing ones.155  The successor to H.R.4026, Section 122 of the 
Housing and Community Development Act of 1987, added Section 20, “Public 
Housing Resident Management,” to the United States Housing Act. The new 
section mandated a process for creating a resident management entity, in which 
the elected resident council would be responsible for approving or rejecting the 
creation of a nonprofit resident management corporation,156 and allowed the 
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allocation of up to $100,000 in funds per public housing complex for technical 
assistance to establish resident management entities and for training.157 
The primary questions which this newly institutionalized national program 
had to answer were no different from those posed by the experiments of the 
1970’s and 1980’s: is community-building in public housing best 
conceptualized as culminating in the management of public housing properties; 
is there measurable value in community organization as a goal unto itself; and 
can “community” be generated by external infusions of cash and technical 
assistance? Over three hundred resident organizations received technical 
assistance funds under the Resident Management Technical Assistance Grant 
program as an immediate result of the Housing and Community Development 
Act.158  A study required by the Act159 and conducted in 1992 of eighty 
recipients, all of them new organizations, showed that most of the recipients 
channeled their funding towards training of residents in organization-building. 
This included learning about the mechanics of formerly structuring themselves 
as organizations through incorporation and the drafting of by-laws, and about 
how to conduct elections and meetings.160  As resident leaders had mentioned 
in studies of previous efforts at training tenants to assume management roles, 
many participants in “emerging resident management corporations” considered 
this training in organization-building to be intrinsically valuable, apart from its 
worth as a means to building competence in management.161 
C. From Building the Collective to Uplifting the Individual: Changes in 
Direction of the Technical Assistance Program 
As the technical assistance program created in the late 1980’s continued, it 
was confronted with the question of whether community organization should 
take precedent over other priorities in the scramble for federal funds.  Three 
uneasily reconcilable demands buffeted the program during the mid-1990’s: 
for financial integrity and signs of tangible accomplishment from the residents; 
for signs of tangible accomplishment from HUD, as the agency fought for its 
life under Congressional fire; and for performance to fulfill the goals of 
welfare reform. These demands hastened a movement in the program that had 
already begun: away from training residents to serve the entire tenant body 
through resident management, and towards support for individual efforts at 
economic betterment. 
 
 157. Id. at § 122, 101 Stat. at 1842 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437r(f)). 
 158. Gregg G. Van Ryzin, The Impact of Resident Management on Residents’ Satisfaction 
with Public Housing, 20 EVAL. REV. 485, 486 (1996). 
 159. See Housing and Community Development Act § 122, 101 Stat. at 1842. 
 160. ICF INC., REPORT ON EMERGING RESIDENT MANAGEMENT CORPORATIONS IN PUBLIC 
HOUSING 3-11, 3-12 (1993) [hereinafter ICF 1993]. 
 161. Id. at 4-4. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
292 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:259 
Despite the award of 986 grants of about $80 million in total to public 
housing tenants organizations under the 1987 Act between 1988 and 1998, 
since its congressionally-mandated study of 1993 HUD has commissioned no 
evaluations of the accomplishments of resident organizations.162  It is 
necessary to re-construct the history of the program through administrative 
notices and other sources. In 1994 HUD re-named and restructured the resident 
management assistance program as the “Tenant Opportunity Program” (TOP), 
with emphasis on insuring the organizational integrity of tenant bodies through 
formally monitored elections, the institution of fixed three year terms and 
recall provisions for officers, the adoption of by-laws, and delineation of the 
relationship between resident management corporations and their parent 
resident councils.163  This re-emphasis on the core activity of organization-
building addressed baseline problems concerning “internal conflicts between 
competing resident councils” and the need among residents and resistant 
housing authorities for clear guidance on election and training procedures to 
insure the participation of representative, responsive tenant organizations.164  
HUD would continue for the next few years to use proof of incorporation, by-
laws, application for recognition of federal tax exempt status, and democratic, 
fair elections of residents’ council representatives as benchmarks of 
achievement, stressing their importance in administrative notices and including 
them as items to be checked on work plans and on formal semi-annual 
reports.165 
HUD extolled the value of TOP-sponsored training in organizational 
development as enabling residents to “. . . .move toward responsible roles in 
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their communities. . . .”166  But in its re-structuring of the program the agency 
also made it clear that its goals for TOP extended beyond the preparation of 
leadership for community strengthening: 
(1) (To) Prepare residents to experience the dignity of meaningful work, to 
own and operate resident businesses, and to move toward financial 
independence; (2) enable them to choose where they want to live; and (3) 
assure meaningful participation in the management of their housing 
developments.167 
HUD also stated its intent to advocate amendment of the technical assistance 
portion of the U.S. Housing Act to allow for funding resident initiatives apart 
from resident management.168 
The dual emphasis on capacity building for the sake of the individual, and 
on capacity building for the sake of the community, underscored a basic worry: 
could training in fiscal accountability, program management, and board 
development remedy the lack of experience which public housing residents 
may have had in these areas? HUD needed to be concerned about residents’ 
capabilities to bid for and run multi-thousand dollar programs for the sake not 
only of pure program integrity, but of challenges to HUD’s own credibility. As 
noted earlier, HUD faced congressional pressures for its elimination; in 1994 
the agency authored its “Reinvention Blueprint” to pre-empt externally 
imposed crippling budget cuts.169  The agency echoed the “reinvention” theme 
at every opportunity, highlighting how its re-design in 1994 of the resident 
management technical assistance program “reinvented resident 
management.”170  Anxiety over what residents were doing with federal funds, 
and what Congress thought about it, was warranted: in 1996 Congress 
threatened to defund TOP for weaknesses in financial controls.171  Whether 
this warning was justified by conditions in the field, or motivated by political 
considerations, HUD’s administrative notices to the field between 1995 and 
1997 did indicate concerns about the accountability of inexperienced grantees.  
Most residents councils were dependent on consultants to assist in grant-
writing and program design, and needed guidance in the proper competitive 
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process and the merits in choosing those consultants.172  HUD also 
communicated concern about whether the grantees were spending training 
money appropriately, and were choosing training appropriate to the goals of 
the program.173  Citing a “lack of focus on performance objectives” and 
“failure to target TOP grants toward the basic self-sufficiency needs of 
residents,” in 1997 HUD reported that it put 64 grantees in default for failure to 
comply with the terms of the program.174 
Responding to passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, in 1997 HUD restructured the TOP 
again, with channeling funds towards “welfare to work” as the explicit goal.  
The prospect that a significant minority of the public housing population could 
lose income through the imposition of time limits on welfare set a priority for 
action, an urgency that elevated the strain in the program that delivered social 
services to individuals over that which built capacity for the collective.175  
Reflecting that preoccupation, the grant notice required applicants to 
demonstrate that a minimum of 75% of the residents assisted by their programs 
were individuals “affected “by the welfare reform legislation.176  It also 
characterized the TOP as focused on individual enhancement, with projects 
“. . .aimed at furthering economic lift and independence” and technical 
assistance grants as targeted to benefit residents “. . . by obtaining skills that 
will make them more employable in the local community.”177  It is noticeable 
that, of the six categories of activities eligible for funding, “resident capacity 
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building” in areas such as community organizing and board development was 
fifth, following “homeownership opportunity,” “resident management” and 
“resident management business development” for individual entrepreneurs in 
descending order, with first place accorded to “social support needs” such as 
child care, literacy, services for elderly and disabled residents, and training 
programs on substance abuse.178  HUD also incorporated ongoing concerns 
about residents’ capabilities to take on projects, for the first time requiring 
applicants already to have secured or to have applied for recognition of federal 
tax exempt status.179 The notice of funding availability for the 1998 TOP 
program echoed the emphasis on moving “welfare dependent families” to 
work. For the first time, HUD explicitly directed organizational development 
grant funds to enable residents to engage not only in managing property, but in 
running welfare to work programs.180  At the same time, HUD did authorize 
use of TOP funds for less targeted, more community-building activities, such 
as training board members of residents’ organizations in community 
organizing.181 
To the present, the pressure to move residents from welfare to work has 
dominated what began as a training program for public housing residents to 
exercise collective self-determination in managing their properties.  In the 
1998 QHWRA, Congress formalized what the agency had for all purposes 
already accomplished: it deleted section 20(f) of the United States Housing 
Act, that part of the 1987 Housing and Community Development Act that had 
authorized expenditures for training in resident management, and added a new 
section 34, “Services for Public Housing Residents.”182  The new statutory 
section confined eligibility for funding to activities “. . .designed to promote 
the self-sufficiency of public housing residents or provide supportive services 
for such residents,. . . .” Of the specifically enumerated eligible activities, 
resident management ranked fifth out of five, behind funding service 
coordinators, space for the delivery of supportive services, and the services 
themselves, which included services such as adult literacy, job search skills 
and child care ancillary to work readiness.183 
Consequently, HUD’s 1999 round for funding technical assistance to 
public housing residents eliminated TOP, and substituted for it the Resident 
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Opportunities and Self Sufficiency Program (ROSS).184 ROSS funds an 
expansive range of activities. These include existing and new resident 
management initiatives and resident business development, and services one 
would normally associate with them, such as aid in negotiating management 
contracts and in drafting business plans.185  Also as before, HUD has stretched 
the list of eligible projects to encompass programs to deliver social services 
such as employment counseling, youth programs, housekeeping and personal 
care for the elderly and disabled, and child care. What ROSS does not do 
explicitly is reserve funds for the “soft skills” of community organizing, board 
development or leadership training, although it does offer “capacity-building 
grants” to enable resident associations to participate in resident management, 
administer their grants, or “participate in Housing Agency decision making.”186  
As HUD has offered since 1998, the technical assistance program does fund 
residents to hire mediators actually to mediate disputes among residents, and to 
train residents in principles of mediation.187 
D. Training for Resident Organizations: Whose Measure of Success? 
The absence of any collection of, or assessment of, performance data for 
most of the twelve year history of national technical assistance to public 
housing residents’ organizations cripples any attempt to evaluate the impact of 
the program. As is so often the case, we hear about the failures: about the 
program funds that pay for trips to Las Vegas and for big screen TVs, the 
irregularities that justified apprehensiveness about residents’ savvy in choosing 
consultants and using other people’s money.188  We also know, as stated 
earlier, that in roughly only thirteen complexes do residents exercise full 
management control over their properties. If management is the measure, then 
a quarter century of private and public funding to groom tenants to take charge 
of their physical environments has been a failure. 
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What we can know only imperfectly is whether, by other measures, 
funding to resident organizations has ever been a success. Where goals mix 
and shift, as they have throughout these programs—between collective and 
individual empowerment, between building both concrete and intangible 
structures for staying in a stable community and for giving individuals the 
tools to move out—measurement is almost impossible.  As I have described, 
the studies that reviewed the first decade and a half of experiments in resident 
management training frequently return over and over again to the “soft skills” 
in which trainees took great pride—the education in listening, in conducting 
effective meetings. Arguably the acquisition of these skills as an end in itself 
was the unintended byproduct of some residents’ lack of formal education in 
the most basic skills of management; trainers were forced to focus long and 
hard on what they initially thought would be quick first lessons in organization 
-building. As analysts of community-based organizations know, the creation of 
an organization whose chief product is the building of capacity for citizenship 
is not an achievement which funders easily can or will quantify, assess, and 
pay for.189  In this respect, Congress and HUD were no different from any 
foundation or corporate grantor. Particularly once welfare revision made 
moving residents into jobs, any jobs, an imperative, the federal funder’s 
impatience with collective empowerment as a product manifested itself in the 
strengthening of emphasis in the TOP program on individual economic self-
sufficiency. 
But training in the “arts of democracy” is in fact a part of what funders of 
private community-based organizations are now orienting themselves to do, 
under the theory that “capacity-building” for stable, accountable institutions is 
a necessary prerequisite to more tangible accomplishment.190  “Capacity,” 
much over-used and under-defined, has been described as consisting of the 
internal strength of an organization’s board, employees and members, that 
enables the organization to engage in the functions most significant for its 
ability to improve its community: running programs, collaborating with other 
institutions, advocating for residents in the political arena, and collecting 
 
 189. Herbert J. Rubin, There Ain’t Going to be Any Bakeries if There is No Money to Afford 
Jellyrolls: The Organic Theory of Community Based Development, 41 SOC. PROBS. 401, 405 
(1994) (noting a history of conflict between community based organizations and their funders, 
whether from government or the private sector, over whether to place priority on measurable 
products such as housing, or on less tangible projects such as community empowerment). 
 190. Allan D. Wallis, Toward a Paradigm of Community-Making, 85 NAT’L CIVIC REV. 34, 
35 (1996); Norman J. Glickman & Lisa J. Servon, More Than Bricks and Sticks: Five 
Components of Community Development Corporation Capacity, 9 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 497, 
499-502 (1998) (summarizing recent developments in funding for “comprehensive community 
initiatives” and other community building projects that focus on developing the leadership 
capacity or community-based organizations). 
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resources for its own support.191  It is certainly not clear that successful 
resident management, with more measurable outcomes, is successful at 
promoting resident participation and democracy, and consequently at 
developing broad-based capacity. Not all residents want to become involved in 
the nitty gritty of property management; conversely, residents consumed with 
the details of property management may have no time, or inclination, for 
democratic process.192  Desirability of training residents in capacity building as 
a long term investment in community building, just as foundations now pay for 
it for neighborhood-based organizations, depends again on the perception of 
whether there is anyone worth training. If the “human capital” equivalent of 
“severely distressed” is “severely without capacity,” as Wilson’s theories and 
the mixed income ideology suggest, then there is no role for capacity-building 
for the current tenants of public housing. 
V.  COMMUNITY-BUILDING IN A DIASPORA: THE MIXED MESSAGES OF 
CURRENT PUBLIC HOUSING POLICY 
The HOPE VI program, and the QHWRA that formalized many of its 
features into law,193 achieve a contradiction: the enhancement of resident 
participation in planning for new communities “. . .when virtually no residents 
remain to participate.”194  As noted earlier, the 1998 overhaul of the U.S. 
Housing Act makes law the theory that clusters of poor people, primarily 
unemployed single female heads of household with children, produce 
unhealthy neighborhoods. To dissipate these clusters, the Act removes 
elements of former public housing law that conserved low rent housing stock 
 
 191. Glickman & Servon, supra note 190, at 501-506. 
 192. Gregg. G. Van Ryzin, The Impact of Resident Management on Residents’ Satisfaction 
with Public Housing, 20 EVAL. REV. 485, 499 (1996) (in a study of resident satisfaction with 
resident management in public housing complexes, finding that residents placed little value on 
opportunities to be involved in decisions about the property); Rubin, supra note 189, at 403 
(questioning whether development activities draw the administrators of community based 
organizations away from advocacy). 
 193. QHWRA § 535, 112 Stat. at 2581 (incorporating the pragmatic standards of HOPE VI 
into law).  Jerry J. Salama, The Redevelopment of Distressed Public Housing: Early Results from 
HOPE VI Projects in Atlanta, Chicago, and San Antonio, 10 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 95, 97 (1999) 
(describing the goals of the QHWRA as “distilled” from HUD’s Notices of Funding Availability 
for the HOPE VI program in 1996-98).  Eileen M. Greenbaum, Quality Housing and Work 
Responsibility Act of 1998: Its Major Impact on the Development of Public Housing, 8 J. 
AFFORDABLE HOUS. & COMM. DEV. L. 310, 310 (1999) (tracing line of descent from the 
National Commission’s Report through Pub. L. 102-389, the Urban Revitalization 
Demonstration, Department of Veterans Affairs and HUD and Independent Agencies 
Appropriations Act of 1993, and continued through successive HUD appropriations bills as 
HOPE VI).  Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Thinking Regionally About Affordable Housing and 
Neighborhood Development, 28 STETSON L. REV. 577, 588-89 n.75, n.79 (1999). 
 194. Salama, supra note 193, at 131. 
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for very poor people. The HOPE VI program provides one vehicle for 
implementing the objective of de-concentration. “De-concentration” need not 
mean elimination: housing authorities’ applications for HOPE VI funds are 
rated for the effectiveness of their de-concentration plans, and not for reduction 
in the numbers of public housing units. In theory, housing authorities may 
replace demolished units as long as they locate them in neighborhoods 
“. . .with low levels of poverty and/or concentrations of minorities.”195 
But reduction in the numbers of public housing units affordable for 
residents of extremely low income in fact seems to be a hallmark of HOPE VI 
plans. In his study of HOPE VI projects in Chicago, Atlanta, and San Antonio, 
Jerry Salama found that of the 1001 units of public housing to be replaced in 
the Techwood/Clark-Howell Homes in Atlanta, 360 would be targeted to 
tenants eligible for public housing;196 and in Cabrini-Green in Chicago, 139 
units would remain for unemployed, very low income residents out of an 
original 1,324, in a neighborhood in which 7% of the residents received 
income from work.197  Other HOPE VI projects present similar profiles.198  
While the high vacancy rates in some complexes means that few residents 
remain to be displaced,199 the destruction of these units still results in a net loss 
of units affordable to very poor people. Although HUD allows a housing 
authority to dedicate up to fifteen percent of HOPE VI programs funds for a 
 
 195. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Funding Availability for the HOPE VI 
Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 9599, 9613 (Feb. 24, 2000) [hereinafter HOPE VI, FY 2000 NOFA]. 
 196. Salama, supra note 193, at 106. 
 197. Id. at 108. 
 198. It is almost impossible to retrieve a representative sample from the 247 HOPE VI 
projects funded through 1999.  See supra note 47.  Wide variations are possible within the same 
region depending on local law, the particular local housing authorities’ ability to garner high 
levels of public subsidy to bring down the costs of renovation or construction, or make 
development sufficiently attractive to the private sector so that market rate or “affordable” 
housing at the high end will subsidize the very low rent units. For example, a local one for one 
replacement rule will mandate the complete replacement of demolished public housing units in 
the Samuel Madden site in Alexandria, Virginia. Telephone conversation with Paul Fiscella, 
attorney for the Alexandria Residents’ Council (Dec. 17, 1999).  See also Housing Research 
Foundation, Samuel Madden Homes: HOPE VI Site Profile, available at www.housingresearch. 
org/hrf/hrf, visited June 30, 2000) (that the Alexandria, Virginia Redevelopment and Housing 
Authority will demolish and fully replace 100 public housing units, with an additional 14 units to 
be built for “affordable homeownership” and 152 unsubsidized homeownership units;) id, George 
B. Murphy Homes, Emerson Julian Gardens: HOPE VI Site Profile (demolition by Baltimore 
City Housing Authority of 793 units and replacement with 260, with “over half” providing 
affordable homeownership, and no detail on disposition of the other units). 
 199. See, e.g., Housing Research Foundation, St. Thomas HOPE VI Site Profile, Update Jan. 
4, 2000, available at www.housingresearch.org/hrf/hrf (stating that the Housing Authority of 
New Orleans planned with its 1996 HOPE VI grant to demolish 1310 of 1510 units of the St. 
Thomas development, and reserve 30% of the remaining two hundred units after their 
rehabilitation for families earning under 30% of median income; 51% of the complex was 
vacant). 
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mandatory “Community and Supportive Services Program,” one that must 
provide intensive services to relocated and remaining residents alike to enable 
them to achieve, among other goals, living wage jobs,200 no one has monitored 
whether these programs have enabled residents initially earning below 10% of 
median income to gain enough income to afford rents and mortgage payments 
targeted at residents earning up to 80%. One study that HUD commissioned 
depicts the newfound stability, cleanliness, and community spirit of the 
renovated HOPE VI communities—and also describes several former housing 
projects to which fewer than a third of the original residents have returned.201  
The five and ten year follow-ups that HUD promises of its assessment in 1996 
of fifteen HOPE VI projects should give a more systematic picture of who 
moves back in, and under what circumstances. 202 
As Salama notes, the three developments demonstrate the market realities 
of de-concentration and public-private partnerships. One attraction of HOPE 
VI’s “mixed finance” possibilities is the ability it gives public housing 
authorities to diversify types of housing stock and, of course, incomes of the 
occupants; another is “leverage,” to enable a housing authority to augment 
public with private funds, so that the profits from market rate rental units could 
subsidize replacement of public housing units affordable to very low income 
renters.203  But at least in this sample, “cross-subsidization” only worked one 
way. Of the three projects studied, none commanded sufficient private 
resources to offset the considerable costs of keeping the rents in renovated 
 
 200. See HOPE VI, FY 2000 NOFA, supra note 195, at 9600 (allowing up to 15% of grant 
money to pay for community and supportive services); id. at 9604-5 (requiring housing authority 
to include information in its VI proposal about how it will track relocated residents in order to 
provide social services to them; listing eligible activities for Community and Supportive Services 
funds). 
 201. Arthur J. Naparstek, Susan R. Freis & G.Thomas Kingsley, prepared for the Department 
of Housing and Urban Development, HOPE VI: Community Building Makes A Difference at 17-
20 (Feb. 2000) (describing the HOPE VI revitalization of the Windsor Terrace public housing 
complex in Columbus, Ohio).  The Windsor Terrace HOPE VI project replaced 442 public 
housing units with 230.  Id. at 19.  While 6% of the former residents were “gainfully employed,” 
id. at 17, 160 of the household heads of families moving into the new 230 units had jobs, id. at 
18. Of the new occupants, only 89 out of the original 359 residents occupying the complex before 
demolition had returned. The authors of this study commented that this return rate of under 25% 
repeats in other HOPE VI sites.  Id. at 20. 
 202. HUD HOPE VI Baseline, supra note 61, at 1-1 (1996) (introduction to the Baseline 
Assessment Study); id. at Exhibit 6-3, “Impacts on Original Residents” at 6-6 (table indicating 
questions about participation in HOPE VI process, relocation, and return, to be researched as part 
of the five and ten year follow-up studies). 
 203. See 24 C.F.R. § 941.600 (2000) (authorizing public housing authorities “. . .to use a 
combination of private financing and public housing development funds to develop public 
housing units,. . .” and along with development partners “. . .to structure transactions that make 
use of private and/or public sources of financing”). 
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apartments affordable to renters at 30% of median income.204  The only way 
that the San Antonio housing authority was able to replace with public housing 
units virtually all the 421 units it was tearing down in the Spring View 
Apartments was with its own grant money—a very large HOPE VI award for a 
relatively small number of units.205 
In noting the possibilities which HOPE VI offers for partnerships between 
public housing authorities and developers, one commentator has enumerated 
the ability to transfer “valuable tracts of developable land” as among the assets 
that any housing authority has to contribute to any deal.206  For some residents 
who see (as with the Lake Parc example) the sudden outpouring of resources 
for benefits they never had, for the sake of new residents with incomes to 
which they can never aspire, the new public housing communities may seem 
like less of an opportunity for them than a land grab for developers.207  Indeed, 
a study of ten HOPE VI redevelopment plans suggests that gentrification is 
what makes HOPE VI possible, as housing authorities count on new real estate 
activity in surrounding areas to attract more up-scale clientele to market rate 
rentals.208  HUD’s own study forecast gloomy outcomes for HOPE VI projects 
in a few cities, due partly to the residents’ well-grounded skepticism about 
whether their housing authorities could or would make good on their 
commitments.209  Sometimes, residents have rejected the rhetoric of a better 
tomorrow and fought to keep what they know of an imperfect today.210  In 
 
 204. Salama, supra note 193 at 119. It was possible, but not yet assured, at the time of writing 
that the strong housing market in Chicago might allow the Chicago Housing Authority to garner 
sufficient rents from the market rate units in its HOPE VI partnerships to subsidize the rents for 
public housing units.  Id. 
 205. Salama, supra note 193 at 110-11(of the 421 units in this complex, all to be demolished, 
208 would be replaced as public housing units, and 105 as single family homes, with the housing 
authority developing 203 replacement public housing units off site.) 
 206. Paul K. Casey, Jane E. Sheehan & Jon M. Laria, Public Housing, Private Development: 
The Lawyer’s Role, 11 PROBATE & PROPERTY 56,60 (Sept./Oct.1997) 
 207. See Salama, supra note 193, at 97, 98 n.3 (citing “legitimate resident concerns about 
landgrabs” and quoting attorneys for residents of public housing complexes in Chicago); U.S. 
General Accounting Office, HOPE VI: Progress and Problems in Revitalizing Distressed Public 
Housing 16 (July 1998) (describing residents’ fears of displacement in favor of development 
interests in Atlanta, Chicago, and Boston). 
 208. Elvin K. Wyly & Daniel J. Hammell, Islands of Decay in Seas of Renewal: Housing 
Policy and the Resurgence of Gentrification, 10 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 711, 745 (1999) 
 209. HUD HOPE VI Baseline, supra note 61, at 7-1 (1996) (that housing authorities in San 
Francisco and Atlanta “have a history of not delivering on promises to public housing tenants” 
with resultant suspicion on the tenants’ part). 
 210. See Judy Rakowsky, Cathedral Complex Tenants Seek Cutoff of Federal Funds, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Aug. 7, 1999, at B4, col. 5 (residents of the Cathedral public housing complex in 
Boston’s South End oppose city’s HOPE VI application, due to plans to reserve only a third of 
the new development’s units for poor tenants); Telephone conversation with Jay Rose, attorney 
for Cathedral complex tenants, Greater Boston Legal Services, July 6, 2000 (once the Boston 
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other instances, residents have litigated and negotiated to preserve as much as 
possible of an opportunity to return in strength, re-knit as a community.211 
What then is peculiar about current housing policy is that, despite its 
explicit goal of uprooting and re-shuffling very poor residents to achieve 
diverse economic populations,212 it not only retains vestiges of the old resident 
empowerment programs such as ROSS, but provides two vehicles for 
participation if not decision-making by, as noted above, residents who may not 
be there. The HOPE VI application process itself gives residents an 
opportunity to voice concerns about development. HUD mandates some degree 
of resident involvement in the application process for HOPE VI grants. For the 
year 2000 grant cycle the Department not only requires housing authorities to 
hold at least one training session for residents, and three public meetings for 
residents and other community members, on the mechanics of HOPE VI and 
on the details of the authority’s proposed plan, but lays out the particulars of 
what the meetings should cover, including relocation, re-occupancy, and the 
extent of demolition.213  In addition to the threshold requirements it sets for 
holding public meetings, HUD also rates applications for HOPE VI funding on 
the quality of outreach to residents and “the broader community.”214 
Other mechanisms provide potential for residents to affect not merely the 
progress of a particular development, but the governance of their public 
housing authority. With some exceptions, the QHWRA requires governing 
 
Housing Authority (BHA) rejected the Cathedral residents’ suggestion to diversify neighborhood 
incomes by converting some units of the complex to units affordable for residents at 40-80% of 
median income rather than to straight market rate units, since the rapidly gentrifying 
neighborhood already was experiencing an infusion of high-income renters, the residents filed 
written protests with HUD, which denied the BHA’s HOPE VI application). 
 211. See cases cited at note 66 for litigation by residents against the Chicago Housing 
Authority and HUD; and at note 67 for litigation by the established resident council of the 
Alexandria, Virginia public housing community to force the housing authority to recognize its bid 
to develop the property. Residents of the Mission Main complex in Boston negotiated the right to 
return of all five hundred households in occupancy before the beginning of demolition, with a 
rental mix of 300 of the 535 projected units to be affordable to residents below 30% of median 
income, 145 for residents at 35-65% of median, and 90 to be market rate.  Telephone 
conversation with Jay Rose, attorney for Mission Main tenants, supra note 210. 
 212. See Department of Housing and Urban Development, Rule to Deconcentrate Poverty and 
Promote Integration in Public Housing Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 81,213, 81,215 (Dec. 22, 2000) 
(explaining how Housing Authorities may skip over applicants on waiting lists to further a 
deconcentration policy). 
 213. HOPE VI, FY 2000 NOFA, supra note 195, at 9604 (requirements for public meetings 
for HOPE VI Revitalization applications); id. at 9608 (documentation required to show 
compliance with requirement of public meetings). 
 214. Id. at 9614 (awarding one point for communicating “regularly and significantly with 
affected residents and members of the surrounding community about your application. . .” and 
demonstrating that “affected residents” received “substantive opportunities to participate in the 
development of your HOPE VI plan”). 
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boards of housing authorities to include in their membership at least one tenant 
“directly assisted by the public housing agency,” whom, depending on the 
agency’s five year plan, the tenants may elect.215  In addition, a newer 
institution through which residents may exert influence on the direction of their 
public housing authority is the resident advisory board, an innovation instituted 
by the QHWRA.216  The resident advisory board exists to participate in the 
formulation of five year and annual public housing agency plans, another new 
requirement, plans which dictate the direction of the housing authority on all 
critical activities such as admissions and occupancy, assessment of how to 
meet housing needs, and plans for demolition or disposition of properties.217  
Housing authorities must document the participation of, or at least consultation 
with, resident advisory boards in the formulation of these plans before they can 
submit them to HUD.218 
As with so many policy directives, it is hard to know whether the dictates 
on paper translate into a difference in the field. No data is available on the 
compliance of housing authorities with the creation of resident advisory 
boards, let alone on the substantive contributions of the boards themselves. 
Though commentators have expressed optimism about the potential for 
residents to use their boards to build the goal of conservation of affordable 
housing into the five year plans, and the annual plans to review compliance 
with the overarching goal,219 true participation will depend on whether 
residents receive adequate notice of public hearings on the plans in time to do 
 
 215. QHWRA §505, 112 Stat. at 2523.  Exceptions include public housing authorities in 
states which require members of governing bodies to be salaried and to serve full time; and 
authorities with fewer than three hundred units, if the resident advisory board receives and fails to 
respond to notice that residents may serve.  Id.  See also Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, Proposed Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 33,644, 33,645 (June 23, 1999) (implementing Pub.L. 
105-276, §505). 
 216. QHWRA §511, 112 Stat. at 2534. 
 217. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Public Housing Agency Plans, Final 
Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 56,844, 56,862 (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. § 903.5) (describing the 
information that a housing authority must include in its five year plan); id. at 56,863 (to be 
codified at 24 C.F.R. § 903.7) (describing the information that must be included in an annual 
plan); id. at 56,866 (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. § 903.13) (describing the role and composition of 
the Resident Advisory Board). 
 218. Id. at 56,866 (describing process of consultation with resident advisory board before 
submission of the annual plan); id. at 56,867 (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. § 905.21) (describing 
process of consultation with resident advisory board “or other resident organization” before 
submission of the five year plan). 
 219. See David B. Bryson & Daniel P. Lindsey, The Annual Public Housing Authority Plan: 
A New Opportunity to Influence Local Public Housing and Section 8 Policy, 33 CLEARINGHOUSE 
REV. 87, 103 (May-June 1999). 
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anything about them, and whether the resident advisory boards engage in 
meaningful consultation.220 
As for resident participation in the HOPE VI process, a sample of HUD’s 
ratings of the HOPE VI applications might indicate whether a proposal ever 
stood or fell on whether it could show attendance at informational meetings of 
thirty residents or three hundred—or whether those residents’ opinions made a 
difference in the decisions made about development. HUD’s study of fifteen of 
the first recipients of HOPE VI grants and of the residents in the affected 
public housing complexes revealed a range of involvement by residents in the 
planning, from “broad and active participation” to “‘next to nil.’”221  HUD’s 
informal program guidance to housing authorities sends a mixed message 
about the essentialness of the participation of public housing residents in the 
design of HOPE VI projects. While the Department calls upon local authorities 
to solicit the “advice counsel, recommendations and input of affected residents 
and the broader community,”222 it also emphasizes that as the grantee, the 
authority has ultimate power to decide the disposition of funds, and that 
resident input is “integral” to planning and implementation, “without 
controlling it.”223 
Finally, only the regulations for the resident advisory boards even attempt 
to answer the question of who will participate when it’s up to the last person 
who’s left to turn out the lights. 
The regulations anticipate a range of possibilities for selection of 
members—from existing jurisdiction-wide or individual resident councils. As 
may be the case for complexes where tenant participation either never took 
hold, or where significant numbers of residents lose their homes so that the 
function of the resident councils is disrupted, from whatever remains of the 
resident constituency generally.224 
VI.  CONCLUSION: COUNTER-IMAGES: DEFENDERS OF COMMUNITY 
A study performed at the Ida B. Wells and Robert Taylor Homes public 
housing complexes in Chicago knits up some of the themes—environmental 
 
 220. HUD’s final rule requires the public housing authority only to provide a copy of the plan 
at its central office during business hours; to publish one 45 day notice of a public hearing, to be 
held at a place “convenient to the tenants;” and to conduct “generally reasonable outreach 
activities.”  Department of Housing and Urban Development, Public Housing Agency Plans, 
Final Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 56,844, 56,866 (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. § 903.17). 
 221. HUD HOPE VI Baseline, supra note 61, at 5-12 (1996) 
 222. Department of Housing and Urban Development, General Guidance on Resident and 
Community Involvement 1 (Oct. 1999), available at www.hud.gov/pih/programs/ph/hope6/ 
genguiderescominv.pdf. 
 223. Id. at 2. 
 224. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Public Housing Agency Plans, Final 
Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 56,844, 56,862 (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. § 903.13(b)). 
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determinism; characteristics, real and imagined of the community of public 
housing residents—that I have discussed, and also suggests some possibilities 
for different conceptualizations. Researchers enlisted the residents’ councils of 
these two complexes to recruit three “resident observers” to study and record 
where residents congregated in the public spaces of these two very different 
physical plants: the Taylor Homes with its multiple sixteen story high rises; 
and the portion of the older Ida Wells apartments that consisted of low rise row 
houses. The women who were chosen had lived in either of the two 
developments for between nineteen and thirty-two years.225  Over the course of 
several days during June of 1994, these resident observers documented ninety 
six sets of observations of the four sides of any of several targeted buildings 
where people were congregating within fifty yards of any one side. The 
observers noted information for each site on number of adults and youth, 
number of trees, the activities, the distance of the people from the trees and 
from the building, and the distance of the trees from the building.226 
Researchers culled patterns from these reports: that overall, three times as 
many people congregated near spaces with trees as near spaces without 
them;227 that more residents were attracted to the trees that were planted closer 
to the buildings; and that children and adults with children gravitated even 
more to “treed outdoor spaces” than did groups of adults alone.228  They 
extrapolated a good deal more: that by creating manageable zones to which 
people are attracted in large, unmanageable housing complexes with little 
private space, “treed spaces” provide some of the “defensible space,”—
opportunities for surveillance and supervision of children, and for social 
interaction—that these physical spaces lack.229  Another study of the Robert 
Taylor Homes by the same researchers posits stronger social networks among 
the residents who live in “high nature areas.”230 
The researchers in the “tree” study concluded that there may be methods 
for providing more livable public housing complexes that are less drastic than 
demolishing them.231  One could conclude a good deal more. The study’s 
design implicitly acknowledged the presence of several resources in a 
population deemed to be without any: the influence of long term residents who 
 
 225. Rebekah Levine Coley, Frances E. Kuo & William L. Sullivan, Where Does Community 
Grow? The Social Context Created by Nature in Urban Public Housing, 29 ENV. & BEHAVIOR 
468, 473-4 (1997). 
 226. Id. at 477-8. 
 227. Id. at 481. 
 228. Id. at 486. 
 229. Id. at 488-490. 
 230. Coley, Kuo & Sullivan, supra note 225, at 488-9 (citing F.E. Kuo, W.C. Sullivan, R.L. 
Coley & L. Brunson, Fertile Ground For Community: Innercity Neighborhood Common Space 
(1997) (manuscript). 
 231. Id. at 490. 
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can be trained and who have a stake in the community, and the ability of 
residents to make something of the few amenities that they are given. Without 
romanticizing the conditions present in some public housing, other researchers 
of the resident populations in the Chicago complexes slated for demolition also 
have stressed how residents create their own networks to compensate with 
mutual self help for the historic lack of resources: with rides to jobs, with 
baby-sitting, and with doubling-up and combining incomes.232  This is not to 
say that better facilities and access to services would not be welcome. It is to 
say that the mere presence of decaying structures may not be a perfect 
indicator of the capacity of the people inside. 
The benchmarks of “distress” that qualify a public housing project for 
demolition and renovation highlight deficiencies. They do not consider 
counter-benchmarks: the residents’ organizations that, with or without federal 
financial assistance, have cohered long enough to be effective organizers, 
service providers, and advocates against their own dispersal. Some, like the 
Mission Main Tenant Task Force in Boston, are strong enough to survive 
relocation and return. In place since the late 1980’s, the Task Force functions 
with a sixteen member board and paid staff, runs recreational and cultural 
programs and provides other social services—and with original and new board 
members retained enough cohesiveness to persist in tough negotiations with its 
housing authority and political figures to retain the best deal possible for its 
constituents through the HOPE VI reconfiguration.233  Others, like St. Thomas 
Resident Council in New Orleans, have received far less consideration. Despite 
a host of organizing and economic development initiatives, and the 
association’s record in building a consortium of providers across the city to 
supply meaningful social services to the residents,234 St. Thomas faces 
imminent demolition,235 with few truly affordable housing units planned in 
replacement. 
There are doubtless countless other public housing residents’ organizations 
whose activities were considered insufficient proof of the community’s 
viability to warrant less desperate remedies, and which will be compromised or 
 
 232. Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh, An Invisible Community: Inside Chicago’s Public Housing, 8 
AM. PROSPECT, (Sept.-Oct.1997), available at www.prospect.org/archives/34/34venkfs.html.  
Over twenty-five years ago Carol Stack documented how two poor African American families 
living in privately owned housing developed patterns of mutual reliance different from those 
expected from a stereotypical middle class life style. Carol Stack, All Our Kin: Strategies for 
Survival in a Black Community 1-10 (1974). 
 233. Phone conversation with Jay Rose, supra note 210; HUD HOPE VI Baseline, supra note 
61, at 3-27. 
 234. See Young & Christos-Rodgers, supra note 65, at 104-110. 
 235. See Housing Research Foundation, St. Thomas HOPE VI Site Profile, supra note 199; E-
mail correspondence from Prof. William Quigley, Loyola University Law School at New 
Orleans, July 7, 2000. 
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stopped by demolition and relocation. It is too soon to tell whether, as 
happened with their historical predecessors, their efforts will vanish without an 
imprint on memory. 
Epilogue 
Last summer PBS premiered a series, “Great Streets,” a showcase for the 
history of the world’s famous avenues. The inaugural episode featured Fifth 
Avenue in New York City. As any chronicle of this thoroughfare must, the 
program gave prominent place to Central Park. There was plenty of narrative 
about the genius of Olmsted’s design and about the feats of engineering. Of the 
Park’s pre-history, all that was said was that the Park was built on largely 
vacant land.236 
How soon we forget. 
 
 236. Public Broadcasting Service, “Great Streets - Fifth Avenue with Brian Stokes Mitchell,” 
shown July 5, 2000; available at www.pbs.org/pressroom/2000/summer/releases/greatstreets.htm. 
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